Mey Network Info
Mey Network is an integrated blockchain ecosystem designed to bridge the gap between physical assets and the digital world. By combining the power of Meychain—a dedicated Layer 1 blockchain for Real-World Assets (RWAs)—and MeyFi, our decentralized nance platform, Mey Network enables seamless tokenization, trading, and management of assets in a secure, scalable environment.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can update the implementation address.
- The owner can bypass Chainlink VRF and manually seed randomness for any collection.
- The owner can set the trusted VRF Consumer address.
- The owner can deploy new PTO collections.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the PTOFactory smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the MeyNetwork team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Implementation Address Can Be Set to a Non-Contract Address
The setImplementation function in PTOFactory.sol allows the owner to update the address of the base implementation contract used for creating new PTO collections. The function includes a check to prevent the new address from being the zero address, but it critically lacks a validation to ensure that the provided address actually contains deployed contract bytecode. This oversight allows the owner to set the implementation address to any Externally Owned Account (EOA) or an uninitialized address. Consequently, any subsequent attempt to call deployCollection will fail because the address.clone() operation requires the source address to have executable code.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Centralized RNG Manipulation via bypassVRFCallback
The bypassVRFCallback function serves as an emergency fallback mechanism to resolve stuck Chainlink VRF requests. However, it relies on block.prevrandao and block.timestamp to generate the random seed. These sources of entropy are weak and can be influenced by block validators. More critically, because this function is triggered by an admin transaction, the administrator can pre-calculate the outcome of the randomness for upcoming blocks and choose to execute the transaction only in a block that yields a favorable result (e.g., ensuring a specific user gets a rare NFT). This reintroduces the exact class of randomness manipulation attacks that Chainlink VRF is designed to prevent, effectively granting the admin discretionary control over the "random" distribution of assets in an emergency scenario.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Systemic Fragility in VRF Callback Handling Leads to Permanent Asset Freeze
The PTOFactory acts as a central router for Chainlink VRF callbacks (handleVRFCallback) and manual overrides (bypassVRFCallback). Both functions blindly call PTO.processVRFCallback without any error handling (e.g., try/catch). Because these functions execute asynchronously after a user has already successfully paid for and "pending-minted" their NFTs, a revert in the child PTO contract (e.g., due to an Out-Of-Gas error from a large batch, or a logic bug) will cause the entire callback transaction to fail. Since the Factory provides no mechanism to "catch" this failure, mark the request as "failed", or skip the processing to unlock the user's state, the user's assets remain permanently stuck in the "Pending" status with no possibility of recovery, even by the admin.