Mey Network Info
Mey Network is an integrated blockchain ecosystem designed to bridge the gap between physical assets and the digital world. By combining the power of Meychain—a dedicated Layer 1 blockchain for Real-World Assets (RWAs)—and MeyFi, our decentralized nance platform, Mey Network enables seamless tokenization, trading, and management of assets in a secure, scalable environment.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can update the existing tier.
- The owner can remove the tier.
- The owner ccan update the staking contract address.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the StakingTierManager smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the MeyNetwork team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
State Corruption in removeTier due to Improper Array Deletion
The removeTier function in the StakingTierManager contract contains a critical flaw in its state management logic. The function uses the delete keyword on a storage array element (delete tiers[tierId]), which does not remove the element and shrink the array as one might expect. Instead, it resets the element at that index to its default "zeroed" state (i.e., name: "", threshold: 0), while the length of the tiers array remains unchanged. This creates a persistent "ghost" tier with a threshold of zero. The getTierFromStaking logic, which iterates downwards, will incorrectly match users against this zero-threshold tier before it can evaluate lower, valid tiers, thereby assigning them the wrong tier ID and preventing them from being correctly categorized.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Missing Contract Existence Check on Input Addresses
The initialize and updateStakingContracts functions both accept an array of addresses that are intended to be pointers to active staking contracts. The code directly casts these addresses to the IStakingContract interface and stores them without verifying if the provided addresses actually have code deployed to them. This allows for Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs), or any address with no contract code, to be added to the stakingContracts array. When _getTotalStakingAmount is later called, it will attempt to call stakeAmount() on these non-contract addresses. Such calls do not revert; they simply succeed and return a default value of 0. This leads to silent failures where a user's total stake is miscalculated, potentially denying them access to the correct tier without any warning or error.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
Unused code
It is recommended to remove the unused code from the contract.