Mey Network Info
Mey Network is an integrated blockchain ecosystem designed to bridge the gap between physical assets and the digital world. By combining the power of Meychain—a dedicated Layer 1 blockchain for Real-World Assets (RWAs)—and MeyFi, our decentralized nance platform, Mey Network enables seamless tokenization, trading, and management of assets in a secure, scalable environment.
TrustNet Score
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
PTO.sol
- The owner can set the NFT parameters in the contract.
- The owner can add phases to the contract.
- The owner can update the existing phase.
- The owner can remove the phase.
- The owner can update the NFT parameters.
- The owner can update the tier.
- The owner can withdraw tokens and ETH from the contract.
Note—This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Mey Network PTO smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Mey Network team. Our team did not audit other contracts associated with the project. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
No Protection Against Flash Loan Exploits
The fundLoan function lacks protection against flash loan exploits, enabling attackers to use temporary borrowed funds to mint large numbers of NFTs unfairly. Without time-based restrictions, funding source verification, or individual contribution limits, attackers can manipulate the NFT supply, gain tier privileges, and exhaust resources, leaving genuine users disadvantaged. This creates an uneven playing field, disrupts active phases, and risks the contract’s integrity. To mitigate these risks, mechanisms like cooldown periods, user stake requirements, funding source validation, contribution caps, and real-time phase controls should be implemented to ensure fair participation and prevent exploitative behavior.
Acknowledged
#2 high Issue
Improper handling of loans
The claimNFTs function in the contract has significant vulnerabilities related to improper handling of loans. It fails to validate loans against phase-specific rules or tier-based restrictions, allowing lenders to potentially claim NFTs for ineligible loans or exceed their allocated limits. For instance, a lender from a lower tier might bypass allocation limits and monopolize NFT supply, violating fairness. The function also lacks robust checks against manipulated loan states, such as loans improperly flagged as refunded or claimed. This creates a risk of double claims or exploitation through state tampering in other contract functions. Additionally, the function doesn’t verify if the total number of claimed NFTs aligns with the active phase’s minting limits. These issues could lead to unfair NFT allocation, loss of trust in the platform, and financial losses for users. Adding phase-specific validations, tier-based restrictions, and comprehensive loan integrity checks is essential to resolve these vulnerabilities and ensure fair, secure operations.
medium Issues | 3 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
Phases Can Be Manipulated
The fundLoan function relies on dynamically managed phases, which are vulnerable to manipulation by the contract owner. Owners can alter phase parameters (e.g., maxNFTsAllowed, startTime, endTime, or allowedTiers) during lending, disrupting fairness and enabling unauthorized participation. This creates risks such as unfair NFT distribution, resource exhaustion through community phases, or exclusion of genuine lenders. Such unchecked changes erode trust, as they undermine the integrity of the lending process. To address this, phase parameters should be immutable once active, or updates should require delays and consensus to ensure transparency and fairness in NFT allocation and participation.
Acknowledged
#2 medium Issue
No Limit on Maximum Loan Amount
The absence of a maximum loan cap in the fundLoan function creates critical vulnerabilities in the contract. A single lender can monopolize the loan pool by contributing excessively high amounts, discouraging smaller participants and concentrating control. This could result in inequitable NFT distribution, where one lender claims a majority of the NFTs, undermining fairness. Furthermore, reward calculations based on loan amounts are directly exploitable. Excessively large contributions could drain the rewards pool due to disproportionate APY payouts, leaving little for other lenders. Malicious actors could also exploit this by using flash loans to contribute the maximum loan amount, claim rewards, and withdraw quickly, disrupting the system. These issues highlight the need for limits on per-transaction and per-lender loan amounts, tying NFT claims to tiers, and capping reward payouts to prevent monopolization, financial instability, and unfair outcomes.
Acknowledged
#3 medium Issue
The owner can drain tokens.
The emergencyWithdrawERC20 function allows the owner to withdraw any ERC20 tokens from the contract without restrictions, posing significant risks. If the owner withdraws all tokens, critical functionalities like refunds (refundLoan) and rewards (claimNFTs) will fail due to insufficient funds, leading to reverted transactions. This undermines user trust, raising concerns of rug pulls or misuse of funds, and risks legal and ethical repercussions. The function lacks safeguards like withdrawal limits, multi-signature approval, or timelocks, leaving it open to potential abuse. To mitigate these risks, restrictions should be added, such as capping withdrawals, requiring multi-signature approval, or implementing timelocks and governance mechanisms to ensure user protection and maintain the platform’s credibility and operational stability.
low Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.