Mey Network Info
Mey Network is an integrated blockchain ecosystem designed to bridge the gap between physical assets and the digital world. By combining the power of Meychain—a dedicated Layer 1 blockchain for Real-World Assets (RWAs)—and MeyFi, our decentralized nance platform, Mey Network enables seamless tokenization, trading, and management of assets in a secure, scalable environment.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can configure reward amounts and claim start times for rarities.
- The owner can withdraw tokens and ETH from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the RarityReward smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the MeyNetwork team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 4 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Unrestricted Modification of Active Reward Configurations
The configureRewards function grants the contract owner unrestricted authority to modify the rewardPerRarity amounts and claimStartTime timestamps at any point in the contract's lifecycle. There are no checks to prevent these changes after the sale has started or after users have successfully minted rare NFTs. This introduces a severe centralization risk where a malicious or compromised administrator could front-run a user's claim transaction to reduce the reward amount to zero, or indefinitely postpone the claim start time, effectively denying users the prizes they have already won and paid for.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Owner Can Arbitrarily Pause Reward Claims
The setClaimEnabled function allows the contract owner to toggle the claimEnabled state variable at any time. When set to false, all calls to claimReward will revert via the _validateClaim check. This grants the administrator the ability to unilaterally freeze all user withdrawals indefinitely, effectively locking user funds in the contract. Unlike a standard "Emergency Pause" (Pausable) which typically has protections or expectations of temporary use, this toggle is part of the core business logic with no constraints, further reinforcing the custodial nature of the reward pool.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Logic Error Prevents Claiming Multiple Rewards for Same Rarity Tier
The claimReward function uses a boolean mapping claimed[msg.sender][rarityId] to track user claims. Once a user claims a reward for a specific rarity tier (e.g., "Gold"), this flag is set to true. The function strictly checks this flag (if (claimed...) revert) before processing any claim. Consequently, if a user successfully claims a reward for one rare NFT and subsequently purchases another rare NFT of the same tier, they are permanently blocked from claiming the reward for the second NFT. This logic incorrectly treats reward eligibility as a one-time event per user per tier, rather than per token, effectively burning the prize value of any subsequent purchases by the same user.
Acknowledged
#4 medium Issue
Owner Can Render Reward Pool Insolvent via withdrawERC20
The withdrawERC20 function permits the contract owner to withdraw any amount of any ERC20 token held by the contract, including the designated rewardToken (e.g., USDC) intended for user prizes. There is no logic to safeguard the funds required for pending or future user claims. Consequently, the owner can accidentally or maliciously drain the contract's entire balance. Since the claimReward function explicitly checks the contract's balance before attempting a transfer (if (balance < rewardAmount) revert...), any such withdrawal that depletes the pool below the required liability will cause all subsequent user claims to fail permanently due to insufficient funds.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.