MEANA Raptor Info
Meana Raptor was born from the fusion of golf, blockchain, and cosmic energy. Its journey began on an ancient golf course, transforming into a beacon of trust and transparency for a decentralized future.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
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TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can initiate the liquidity pool.
- The owner can update the pair address.
- The owner can transfer tokens to the recipient without initiating liquidity.
- The owner can approve the tokens to the router address.
- The owner can update the router address.
- The owner can update the liquidity pool pair.
- The owner can update the buy, sell, transfer tax.
- The owner can update the maximum transaction percentage.
- The owner can update the swap settings and swap threshold value.
- The owner can toggle swapping.
- The owner can airdrop tokens to multiple wallets at once.
- The owner can update the max wallet size amount.
- The owner can exclude wallets from limits.
- The owner can transfer ETH from the contract before the liquidity initializes.
- The owner can exclude wallets from fees.
- The owner can distribute tax.
The ownership of the contract is renounced. Hence, the owner cannot change any of the contract settings.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Meana Raptor token smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Meana Raptor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Unsafe use of tx.origin
The contract uses tx.origin in the _hasLimits function to determine whether transfer limits should apply, which poses a security risk and can cause unintended behavior. Specifically, tx.origin returns the original external account that initiated the transaction, even through multiple contract calls, making the logic unreliable when interacting via smart contract wallets or other contracts. This can break composability and expose the contract to phishing-style attacks where a malicious contract tricks a user into unintentionally executing privileged actions. The safer and more standard approach is to use msg.sender, which reflects the immediate caller of the function, ensuring better security and compatibility with other smart contracts.
Resolved
#2 high Issue
Missing access control.
The setFeeContract function in the contract lacks proper access control, allowing any external user to change the address of the feeContract. This poses a serious security risk, as a malicious actor could assign a harmful contract that mismanages or steals funds during fee processing. Such unauthorized changes can compromise the integrity of the token’s fee logic, disrupt its intended tokenomics, and lead to potential financial losses. To mitigate this, the function should be restricted using the onlyOwner modifier, ensuring that only the contract owner has the authority to update the fee contract address and maintain control over fee-related operations.
medium Issues | 5 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
Liquidity is added to externally owned address.
The contract's liquidity is automatically added to the 'owner' address, which is not recommended because, in an extreme scenario, this can be used to drain liquidity from the contract.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Missing allowance check.
The payFee function lacks a check for token allowance before attempting to transfer tokens using transferFrom, which can lead to unexpected transaction failures if the calling address hasn’t approved sufficient allowance. Without this check, the function assumes that the contract is authorized to spend the specified amount, which may not always be the case. This can cause the transaction to revert without a clear error message, resulting in a poor user experience and making debugging more difficult. To mitigate this issue, an explicit allowance check should be added to ensure that the contract is authorized to transfer the required amount before proceeding with the operation.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check
The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions. To mitigate this, Implement a validation check to ensure that parameters designated as contract addresses are verified as such. This can be done using Solidity’s Address library function isContract, which checks if an address has associated contract code.
Resolved
#4 medium Issue
Incorrect Use of msg.sender in Sell Limit Check
This should use from, not msg.sender. If a contract (e.g., staking or marketplace) initiates the transfer on behalf of the user, the limit will apply incorrectly to the contract instead of the actual token seller. Daily sell limit enforcement can be bypassed using intermediate contracts. The anti-dump mechanism becomes ineffective.
Resolved
#5 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The payFee function exposes a critical reentrancy risk by making an external call to staking.entryCol() without enforcing access control or reentrancy protection. Since the staking contract address can be set to any arbitrary contract, a malicious actor could exploit this by assigning a malicious contract that reenters the token logic during fee processing. This could result in double-spending, draining of funds, or inconsistent internal state during token swaps or transfers. To mitigate this, the contract should restrict who can set the staking contract, enforce reentrancy protection using locking mechanisms, and ensure all internal state changes are finalized before making any external calls.
low Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Old compiler version
Adding the latest constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Missing Visibility
It is recommended to add 'public', 'private' or 'internal' visibility during the initialization or declaration of a state variable or a mapping in the contract.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Unused function parameter
It is recommended that the unused parameter be removed from the function.