MEANA Raptor Info
Meana Raptor was born from the fusion of golf, blockchain, and cosmic energy. Its journey began on an ancient golf course, transforming into a beacon of trust and transparency for a decentralized future.
TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can update the base token URI.
- The owner can update the presale and DAO contract address.
- The owner can update the trusted oracle address.
- The owner can set token URIs for specific rarity levels.
- The owner can set the default royalty percentage (between 5-10%).
- The owner or the NFT contract can mint NFTs via mintInternal function.
- The owner or the DAO contract can reduce the maximum supply.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Meana Raptor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Meana Raptor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Dual Mechanism for Reducing maxSupply
The contract reduces maxSupply through two methods: automatic reduction with each mint and manual reduction via the reduceMaxSupply function. This dual approach creates confusion about the final collection size, deviating from standard patterns where maxSupply typically represents a fixed cap. The design makes supply predictions difficult and increases integration error risks. To mitigate this, remove the automatic reduction from mintInternal, using _currentTokenId to track minting progress against a fixed or adjustable maxSupply. Keep only the manual reduction function for intentional adjustments, and add an event to signal supply changes.
low Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions. To mitigate this, Implement a validation check to ensure that parameters designated as contract addresses are verified as such. This can be done using Solidity’s Address library function isContract, which checks if an address has associated contract code.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 optimization Issue
Gas Inefficiency in Signature Processing
The function creates a new 65-byte array in memory and uses a for-loop to copy each byte individually from the input signature (skipping the first byte which contains rarity). This approach consumes unnecessary gas through memory allocation and loop execution costs (~1500-2300 gas per mint). ECDSA signatures consist of three components (r, s, v) that could be extracted more efficiently using assembly or OpenZeppelin's signature handling utilities. To mitigate this, Replace the loop-based approach with direct extraction of signature components using assembly.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.