The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions. To mitigate this, Implement a validation check to ensure that parameters designated as contract addresses are verified as such. This can be done using Solidity’s Address library function isContract, which checks if an address has associated contract code.

The updatePresaleConfig function allows the owner to modify critical presale parameters, including price-related variables (basePrice, mrtBasePrice, usdtBasePrice, and all priceIncreaseRate values), even while a presale is active and in progress. The only restriction is that the start time cannot be changed after a presale has begun. This means the contract owner can arbitrarily increase or decrease prices mid-sale, potentially harming users who made purchase decisions based on the initial pricing structure. To mitigate this, implement stronger restrictions on price-related parameter changes during active presales. Either completely prevent price modifications once a presale has started, or add a time-lock mechanism that gives users advance notice before price changes take effect.

The mintWithETH function distributes fees to four different recipients and requires all transfers to succeed via require(s1 && s2 && s3 && s4, "Fee distribution failed"). If any recipient becomes unable to accept ETH (due to a self-destructed contract, malicious fallback function, or other failure), the entire minting functionality will be permanently disabled, creating a critical single point of failure with no recovery mechanism. To mitigate this, implement a pull-payment pattern allowing recipients to withdraw their funds rather than pushing payments during minting, or add an emergency mode that can bypass failed distributions. Alternatively, add functionality allowing the owner to update fee recipient addresses if they become compromised, ensuring the contract can continue operating even if one recipient stops accepting payments.

It is recommended to emit all the critical changes in the contract.

The function doesn't verify if the presale is active or has already ended. Allowing updates to a completed presale is generally unnecessary and could create confusion in off-chain tracking systems.

Price increase rates are not validated and could be set to arbitrarily high values, potentially causing arithmetic issues or making mints prohibitively expensive after just a few purchases.