Lumira Info
Despite the AI boom, it remains centralized, opaque, and controlled by a few. Developers can't verify what models are doing, can't own the systems they build, and nobody earns from the value they create. Web3 doesn’t make AI any smarter. But it offers the tools for access, ownership, and monetization: wallets, composability, immutability, and programmable money. While we were promised decentralization, crypto delivered speculation and risk. It added tokens, but left the core systems untouched. Xyber changes that. A full-stack operating system that gives developers the rails to build and monetize AI-native applications — agents, plugins, and protocols — powered by onchain logic, memory, and autonomous economic infrastructure. At the core is PROOF, a trustless execution layer that makes intelligence verifiable, ownable, and economically autonomous.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can mint NFTs directly to specified addresses.
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can set the deposit and claim phase timestamps.
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can set the base URI.
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can set the receiver address.
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can set the merkle roots for the whitelist and public allocations.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Lumira smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Lumira team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The deposit function contains a potential reentrancy vulnerability because it violates the widely-accepted Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) security pattern. The function performs an external call to the ISBTParticipation contract's mint function before it completes all of its own state changes, specifically the transfer of collected ETH to the receiver via sendValue. This ordering creates an opportunity for a malicious or compromised SBT_PARTICIPATION contract to execute a re-entrant call back into the deposit function. Because the original transaction's ETH transfer has not yet occurred, the re-entrant call would observe an inconsistent contract state, potentially allowing an attacker to bypass security checks or corrupt state variables to their advantage.
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Merkle Proof Replay Vulnerability in refund and claim Function
The refund and claim function is susceptible to a Merkle proof replay attack because it lacks a mechanism to prevent the same valid proof from being used multiple times. The function authorizes a refund by validating a Merkle proof but does not track the usage of individual proofs on-chain. While a secondary state check currently prevents a user from draining more funds than they are owed, this design makes the contract's security entirely dependent on the flawless generation of the Merkle tree off-chain. Any human or script error in the off-chain process that results in duplicate or overlapping refund permissions could be exploited, as the contract itself does not enforce the single-use nature of each authorization.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Unclaimed Refundable ETH May Become Permanently Locked
The smart contract's design does not account for a scenario where users fail to claim their ETH refunds from an oversubscribed public sale. The only mechanism to withdraw this excess ETH is the refund function, which must be called by each individual user. There is no alternative withdrawal function available to the project administrators. Consequently, any funds belonging to users who lose their keys, forget to claim, or otherwise fail to call the refund function will remain locked in the contract's balance indefinitely after the sale period ends. While this does not pose a direct security risk or threat of theft, it can lead to a permanent loss of funds for both users and the project.