IXS Launchpad Info
IX Swap is the Uniswap for RWA and bridges the gap between traditional finance and decentralized finance by offering a regulated and innovative platform for trading tokenized Real-World Assets.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner can mint
It is possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner can blacklist addresses
It is possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token can be burned
There is a function to burn tokens in the contract without any allowances.
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
RwaERC20.sol
- The admin can blacklist users from transferring tokens.
- The pauser role can pause/unpause the token transfer.
- The admin can burn tokens from the account without any allowance.
- The admin can burn tokens from multiple accounts in a batch.
- The minter role can mint new tokens in batches.
- The admin can update the max batch burn size.
- The admin can update the max mint batch size.
- The minter role can mint new tokens.
Alleviation - The team acknowledges that some critical issues remain unresolved, such as the ability to reissue tokens if a user loses them or force-burn tokens in case of a hack, as these are necessary to meet compliance requirements for security tokens.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the IXS Launchpad smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the IXS Launchpad team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 high Issue
Burning of tokens without any allowance.
In this contract, the burnFrom function allows an admin to burn tokens from any account without user consent, bypassing the standard allowance mechanism. This centralizes control, risking unauthorized supply reduction and undermining user trust. To mitigate these risks, improvements are recommended. Strengthening role management through multi-signature wallets and time locks can limit unilateral actions. Requiring user consent via allowance checks or opt-in mechanisms further protects token holders. Enhanced transparency with detailed event logging and user notifications, as well as imposing burn caps or incorporating decentralized governance, can ensure a balance between operational needs and safeguarding user assets.
medium Issues | 3 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
The minter can mint unlimited tokens.
The batchMint and mint function lacks a cap on the minting value, allowing the MINTER_ROLE to mint arbitrarily large amounts of tokens per operation. This opens the door to potential inflation and supply manipulation, where a minter could significantly devalue the token by increasing the supply without restraint. To mitigate this risk, it’s advisable to implement checks that restrict the maximum minting amount per transaction or enforce a global cap on the token supply. Additionally, governance controls or multi-signature approvals for large minting operations can provide extra safeguards, ensuring that such operations are thoroughly vetted before execution.
Acknowledged
#2 medium Issue
The admin can blacklist wallets.
The freeze function lets an admin blacklist any wallet by marking it as frozen, which prevents token transfers to or from that address. While this might be useful for mitigating fraudulent or malicious activity, it also grants excessive centralized power. If misused or compromised, an admin could arbitrarily freeze user wallets, undermining trust and access to funds. Mitigation strategies include requiring multi-signature approval or community governance for freeze actions, implementing time delays or appeal mechanisms before freezes take effect, and ensuring transparent logging and oversight of all administrative actions to prevent abuse.
Acknowledged
#3 medium Issue
The pauser role can pause the token transfer for an indefinite period.
the pauser role has the power to halt all token transfers by calling the pause() function. Since there is no built-in mechanism to automatically unpause the contract after a certain period, the pause can remain in effect indefinitely unless the account with the PAUSER_ROLE calls the unpause() function. This design gives significant centralized power to the pauser, as it can effectively freeze token liquidity for an extended period. To mitigate potential abuse, additional controls such as multi-signature requirements, time delays, or governance oversight could be introduced to manage the pause functionality responsibly.
low Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Missing upper and lower limit on batch size.
The functions allow the admin to set the maximum batch sizes without any bounds. This means an admin could set the limits too low (e.g., zero, which would disable batch operations) or too high (potentially causing gas issues or unexpected behavior). Without enforcing upper and lower limits through validation checks (using require statements), there’s a risk of misuse or error. Mitigation involves adding constraints—for instance, requiring that the new value is within a safe range (e.g., greater than zero and less than a defined maximum)—or using multi-signature or governance mechanisms to ensure these parameters are updated responsibly.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 optimization Issue
Public function that could be declared external (external-function)
Use the `external` attribute for functions never called from the contract.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.