IXS Launchpad Info
IX Swap is the Uniswap for RWA and bridges the gap between traditional finance and decentralized finance by offering a regulated and innovative platform for trading tokenized Real-World Assets.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
IXSSale.sol
- The operator can launch the sale.
- The operator can set the new deadline.
- The admin can finalize the sale.
- The admin can claim the tokens for the user.
- The fund manager can claim the tokens in batches.
- The operator can set the new root.
- The operator can set a commit balance for a sale campaign.
- The fund manager can transfer tokens to the recipient address according to presale and public commit.
- The operator can update the presale and public sale price.
- The admin can withdraw the amount of tokens from the sale campaign.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the IXS Launchpad smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the IXS Launchpad team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
The operator can set fees more than 25%.
The fee issue arises because the fee is defined by the feePercent field in the LaunchSale struct, and there are no checks in the launchSale function to ensure that feePercent is within a sensible range. This means an operator can set feePercent to any arbitrary value, potentially resulting in excessively high fees that could significantly diminish the issuer’s proceeds or impose undue costs on investors. To mitigate this risk, a require statement should be added in the launchSale function to enforce that feePercent does not exceed a predetermined maximum value (for example, by using a constant like MAX_ALLOWED_FEE), ensuring that the fee remains within expected bounds.
low Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Lack of Sale Existence Check
The function directly accesses onSales[_saleId] without verifying that a sale with that ID actually exists (for example, by using a dealExist modifier or an explicit check). There is no check such as require(onSales[_saleId].controller != address(0), "SALE_NOT_EXIST"); before updating the deadlines. There is no check such as require(onSales[_saleId].controller != address(0), "SALE_NOT_EXIST"); before updating the deadlines.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Changing Deadlines After the Sale Has Started
The function does not verify whether the sale has already begun or if any investments have been made. After retrieving the sale with there is no check to ensure that the current time is before the sale starts or that no investments have occurred. Allowing deadline changes after a sale has started can be abused by an operator, potentially disadvantaging investors who expected fixed time windows.
Resolved
#3 low Issue
Missing zero check for _amount.
The function only requires that the token address and recipient address are nonzero. It does not check whether _amount is greater than zero. While withdrawing 0 might not cause harm, allowing zero-value withdrawals could be unintended or cause unnecessary events.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Typographical Error in Error Message
The error message "IxsSale: LESS_THEN_SOFT_CAP" contains a typo (“THEN” should be “THAN”).
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
No Further Post‑Finalization Logic
The forceFinalize function itself only sets the finalization flag and emits an event—it does not contain any additional logic to trigger subsequent operations such as token distribution, refunds, or further state changes. In other words, once the sale is force finalized (i.e. when onSaleInvests[_saleId].forceFinalize is set to true), no further “post-finalization” actions are executed within this function.
Resolved
#3 informational Issue
Explicit Role Management
The contract correctly uses OpenZeppelin’s AccessControl, but it explicitly lists Context in the inheritance list even though AccessControlEnumerable already inherits from it. The redundant context can be removed from the contract as it is already inherited through the AccessControlEnumerabble.