INSIDERS Info
The new $INS token is not just a relaunch; it’s a mission in motion. A token born from conviction, sharpened by necessity, and unchained to scale. Originally launched under a rigid framework, $INS outgrew its confines. Now, fully untethered, $INS is positioned as a global meme-utility token with real use, real edge, and real alignment. The relaunch of $INS will be on BASE chain; well-known Layer 2 network with a good user base for $INS’s agenda.
TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The ownership (DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) of the contract is renounced; Hence, the owner cannot change any settings in the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the INSIDERS smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the INSIDERS team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 4 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Excessive Platform Fee
The contract allows platform fees to be set up to 100% (10,000 basis points) plus a fixed 0.5% ThirdWeb fee. This enables the admin to extract all transaction value through fees, potentially draining user funds. The lack of maximum fee caps, timelocks, or gradual increase mechanisms creates a significant risk for users. Implement maximum fee cap (e.g., 25%), add a timelock for fee changes, consider gradual fee increase limits.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Unlimited Token Minting
The contract allows unlimited token minting without implementing a maximum supply cap. Addresses with MINTER_ROLE can mint any amount of tokens without restrictions. This design could lead to token value dilution and economic instability if the MINTER_ROLE is compromised or misused. The only control is the role-based access requirement. Implement a MAX_SUPPLY constant and add supply cap validation: require(totalSupply() + amount <= MAX_SUPPLY, "Exceeds max supply");
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Transfer of tokens without enabling trade
The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize addresses manually and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.
Resolved
#4 medium Issue
Role-Based Transfer Restrictions Implementation
The contract implements transfer restrictions through TRANSFER_ROLE, acting as both a blacklist and transfer control mechanism. By default, addresses cannot transfer tokens unless granted TRANSFER_ROLE. The restriction can be bypassed by granting TRANSFER_ROLE to address(0). This dual-purpose mechanism combines blacklisting and transfer control, where either sender or receiver must have the role to enable transfers, except for minting and burning operations. Consider implementing separate mechanisms for blacklisting and transfer control. Add time-based locks for stronger token movement restrictions.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing Zero Address Validation
The setPlatformFeeInfo function lacks validation for a zero address when setting _platformFeeRecipient. This could lead to fees being sent to the zero address (0x0), effectively burning them if the admin makes a mistake.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Unsafe Type Casting
The contract performs unchecked downcasting from uint256 to uint64 when setting platform fees. While the MAX_BPS check (10,000) provides some safety, explicit type overflow validation would follow best practices for type conversion. Add explicit type bounds check: require(_platformFeeBps <= type(uint64).max, "Fee exceeds uint64 max"); before casting.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Floating Pragma Version
The contract uses a floating pragma ^0.8.11, which means it can be compiled with any compiler version from 0.8.11 up to, but not including, 0.9.0. This could lead to inconsistent behavior as different compiler versions might have different bug fixes or optimizations. Lock the pragma to a specific version.