Harbor Finance Info
Harbor Finance is a high-performance, gamified DeFi ecosystem that seamlessly merges NFT-based asset structures, sustainable passive income strategies, and immersive financial gameplay. Our mission: to make automated earning not just simple, but genuinely enjoyable. Engineer intricate Yield Items. Harvest $FISH. Collect ongoing incentives. Rise through the ranks as a master-class Fishercat.
TrustNet Score
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
ReferralSystem.sol
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant/revoke all other roles in the system.
- The ADMIN_ROLE can register individual referrals (registerReferral).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can register multiple referrals in a batch (registerBatchReferrals).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can set custom referral percentages for specific referrers (setReferralPercentage).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can change the default referral percentage for all users (setDefaultReferralPercentage).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can update the FISH token contract address (updateFishToken).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can rescue stuck FISH tokens from the contract (rescueFishTokens).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can rescue stuck HYPE tokens from the contract (rescueHype).
- The MANAGER_ROLE can add FISH token commissions for referrers (addCommission).
- The MANAGER_ROLE can add HYPE token commissions for referrers (addHypeCommission).
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Harbor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Harbor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Centralized Control of Emergency Pause Mechanism
The ReferralSystem contract implements a pause mechanism that gives the admin unilateral power to freeze all commission claims without notice, timelock, or governance oversight. When paused, users cannot access their earned commissions through claimCommission(), claimHypeCommission(), or claimAll() functions, effectively locking user funds indefinitely. There are no temporal limits on the pause duration, no automatic resumption mechanisms, and no decentralized governance process to override a prolonged pause. This creates a significant centralization risk where a single administrator could prevent users from accessing their rightfully earned commissions.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Admin Can Drain User Funds Through Unrestricted Rescue Functions
The ReferralSystem contract contains a vulnerability in its rescue functions (rescueFishTokens and rescueHype) that allows the admin to withdraw unlimited amounts of tokens without validating remaining balances. These functions have no checks to ensure sufficient tokens remain to cover user pending commissions stored in pendingCommissions and pendingHypeCommissions mappings. If an admin drains the contract, users' claim transactions would fail after their balances are already set to zero, resulting in permanent loss of their earned commissions. This represents a severe centralization risk that could completely undermine the referral system's economic incentives and trust model.
low Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Missing MANAGER_ROLE Assignment in ReferralSystem Constructor
The ReferralSystem contract defines a MANAGER_ROLE that is required to add commissions through the addCommission and addHypeCommission functions. However, the constructor fails to assign this critical role to any address, including the admin. This creates a post-deployment vulnerability where the core commission-adding functionality remains completely inaccessible until an admin manually grants the role, rendering the entire referral system non-functional at launch. If admin access is compromised before this role is assigned, the contract would require redeployment.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Ability to Abruptly Disable Referral Rewards
The setDefaultReferralPercentage function allows the admin to set the default referral percentage to zero with no lower bound validation, effectively disabling the core incentive mechanism for most users without warning. This creates a significant centralization risk as a single admin transaction can immediately halt referral rewards across the system. Additionally, the function lacks the whenNotPaused modifier present in other economic functions, allowing parameter changes even during emergency situations.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Potential Cross-Function Reentrancy in claimHypeCommission
While the claimHypeCommission function follows the checks-effects-interactions pattern by updating state before making external calls (pendingHypeCommissions[msg.sender] = 0 before the ETH transfer), it lacks an explicit nonReentrant guard. During the low-level ETH transfer via call, a malicious contract recipient could potentially reenter other functions in the ReferralSystem contract that interact with related state variables. The existing implementation provides basic protection against single-function reentrancy but doesn't prevent more complex cross-function attack patterns.