Harbor Finance Info
Harbor Finance is a high-performance, gamified DeFi ecosystem that seamlessly merges NFT-based asset structures, sustainable passive income strategies, and immersive financial gameplay. Our mission: to make automated earning not just simple, but genuinely enjoyable. Engineer intricate Yield Items. Harvest $FISH. Collect ongoing incentives. Rise through the ranks as a master-class Fishercat.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
StakingManager.sol
-
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant/revoke all other roles in the system. -
The ADMIN_ROLE can update all contract references simultaneously (updateContracts). -
The ADMIN_ROLE can pause the contract (pause). - The ADMIN_ROLE can unpause the contract(unpause).
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Harbor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Harbor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Admin Ability to Indefinitely Lock User Assets
The unstakeItem function includes the whenNotPaused modifier, allowing the admin to prevent all users from unstaking their NFTs by calling the pause() function. This represents a significant centralization risk, as it could lead to indefinite asset lockup with no governance mechanism or timelock to prevent or delay such actions. If the admin account is compromised or acts maliciously, users' staked assets could become permanently inaccessible, violating the principle that users should maintain ultimate control over their assets. This is particularly concerning because staked NFTs can have significant economic value through their yield generation capabilities, amplifying the potential financial impact of a pause.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Loss of Excess Rewards During Unstaking.
When users unstake items through the StakingManager contract, any excess rewards stored on those items are permanently lost. The unstakeItem function calls yieldItemsNFT.setStakingStatus(itemId, false, 0, 0), which explicitly zeroes out the item's excess rewards value without transferring or preserving these tokens. This is particularly problematic because the RewardDistributor deliberately stores excess rewards (amounts above the maximum claim limit) on individual items via the _storeExcessRewards function, with the expectation that they can be claimed later. Users who unstake without first manually claiming their rewards will have no way to recover these funds, resulting in permanent value loss. This creates a negative user experience and could lead to significant financial losses, especially for users with large accumulated rewards that exceed claim caps.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.