Harbor Finance Info
Harbor Finance is a high-performance, gamified DeFi ecosystem that seamlessly merges NFT-based asset structures, sustainable passive income strategies, and immersive financial gameplay. Our mission: to make automated earning not just simple, but genuinely enjoyable. Engineer intricate Yield Items. Harvest $FISH. Collect ongoing incentives. Rise through the ranks as a master-class Fishercat.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
RewardCalculator.sol
-
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant/revoke all other roles in the system. -
The ADMIN_ROLE can update contract references (updateContracts). -
The ADMIN_ROLE can pause the contract (pause). -
The ADMIN_ROLE can unpause the contract (unpause). -
The MANAGER_ROLE can calculate and update territory rewards (calculateTerritoryRewards).
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Harbor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Harbor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Missing Input Validation in Timestamp Management Functions
The setLastClaimTime and setLastSlotClaimTime functions allow admins to arbitrarily modify reward claim timestamps without any validation. There are no checks that the territoryId exists, that the slotIndex is within valid bounds, or that the timestamp value is reasonable (could be set to far future or long past). This creates several risks: 1) Admins could accidentally or maliciously reset claim times to future timestamps, effectively preventing rewards from accumulating; 2) Setting timestamps to the distant past could allow excess rewards generation; 3) The functions work even for non-existent territories or slots. Since these timestamps directly affect reward calculations in _calculateItemRewards(), manipulation could significantly disrupt the reward economy.
low Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Missing MANAGER_ROLE Assignment in Constructor.
The RewardCalculator contract defines a MANAGER_ROLE, which is required for the critical calculateTerritoryRewards function, but this role is never assigned to any address in the constructor. The constructor only grants ADMIN_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to the admin address. Without the MANAGER_ROLE being assigned, the essential reward calculation functionality would be unusable upon deployment until an admin manually assigns this role. This oversight could lead to system unavailability and prevent users from claiming rewards until the role is explicitly granted, causing significant disruption to the platform's core functionality.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.