Harbor Finance Info
Harbor Finance is a high-performance, gamified DeFi ecosystem that seamlessly merges NFT-based asset structures, sustainable passive income strategies, and immersive financial gameplay. Our mission: to make automated earning not just simple, but genuinely enjoyable. Engineer intricate Yield Items. Harvest $FISH. Collect ongoing incentives. Rise through the ranks as a master-class Fishercat.
TrustNet Score
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
YieldItemsNFT.sol
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant/revoke all other roles in the system.
- The MINTER_ROLE can mint new yield items (mint).
- The STAKING_MANAGER_ROLE can set an item's staking status (setStakingStatus).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can increase an item's level (increaseLevel).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can reset an item's durability (resetDurability).
- The ADMIN_ROLE can update the YieldItemsRegistry address (updateItemsRegistry).
- The MANAGER_ROLE can reset the accumulated expired time for an item (resetExpiredTime).
- The MANAGER_ROLE can add excess rewards to a yield item (addExcessRewards).
- The MANAGER_ROLE can consume excess rewards from a yield item (consumeExcessRewards).
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Harbor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Harbor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
No Protection Against Price Changes in levelUpByOwner Function
The levelUpByOwner function calculates the required FISH tokens for a level-up operation using data from the external itemsRegistry contract without implementing any protection mechanism against mid-transaction price changes. Since the cost calculation and the actual payment occur in separate steps, an admin could update the registry or level-up costs between these operations, creating a price discrepancy. This creates a front-running vulnerability where admins monitoring pending transactions could increase prices just before user transactions confirm, forcing users to pay more than expected or causing transactions to fail if costs exceed user balances. Unlike standard DeFi practices, the function lacks slippage protection parameters or cost commitments.
Acknowledged
#2 medium Issue
No Protection Against Repair Cost Changes in repairByOwner Function
The repairByOwner function retrieves the repair cost dynamically from the external itemsRegistry contract without implementing any protection against mid-transaction price changes. After calculating the cost based on the current registry values, the function performs balance checks and processes payment in separate steps without verifying that the cost remains consistent throughout execution. This creates a vulnerability where an admin could monitor pending transactions and increase repair costs via registry updates before user transactions confirm, forcing users to pay more than expected or causing transactions to fail if costs exceed user balances. Unlike standard DeFi practices, the function lacks maximum cost parameters or any form of price commitment mechanism.
low Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Missing Critical Role Assignments in YieldItemsNFT Constructor
The YieldItemsNFT contract defines several critical roles (MINTER_ROLE, STAKING_MANAGER_ROLE, and MANAGER_ROLE) but fails to assign them to any address in the constructor. While the constructor correctly grants ADMIN_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to the admin address, it omits initialization of these other key roles. This creates a post-deployment vulnerability where core functions like minting new yield items and managing staking status remain completely inaccessible until an admin manually grants these roles in separate transactions. If admin access is compromised before these assignments occur, the contract's primary functionality would be permanently disabled.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Missing Territory and Slot Validation in setStakingStatus Function
The setStakingStatus function accepts arbitrary territoryId and slotIndex values without validating their existence or availability in the territory system. When staking an item, these values are stored directly without verification that the territory exists or that the specified slot is valid and available. This creates potential data integrity issues where items could be staked to non-existent territories or invalid slots if the calling StakingManager contract contains bugs or is compromised. Since this data is used throughout the ecosystem, invalid entries could affect reward calculations or cause unexpected behavior in connected contracts.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.