Harbor Finance Info

Harbor Finance is a high-performance, gamified DeFi ecosystem that seamlessly merges NFT-based asset structures, sustainable passive income strategies, and immersive financial gameplay. Our mission: to make automated earning not just simple, but genuinely enjoyable. Engineer intricate Yield Items. Harvest $FISH. Collect ongoing incentives. Rise through the ranks as a master-class Fishercat.

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TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

23.67
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

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Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/05/05
Revision date 2025/05/05

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
TerritoryRegistry.sol
  • The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant/revoke all other roles in the system.
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can add new territory types (addTerritoryType).
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can update existing territory types (updateTerritoryType).
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can activate or deactivate territory types (setTerritoryTypeStatus).
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can increase the maximum supply for territory types (increaseTerritorySupply).
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can set the URI for territory types (setTerritoryTypeURI).
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can initialize URIs for default territory types (initializeDefaultURIs).
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can pause/unpause the contract (pause, unpause).
  • The REGISTRY_MANAGER_ROLE can record territory minting (recordMint).

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Harbor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Harbor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Missing Parameter Validation
TerritoryRegistry.sol
L71-100
L109-128
Description

The addTerritoryType and updateTerritoryType function accepts critical economic and gameplay parameters without any validation constraints. This allows administrators to create territory types with potentially game-breaking values such as: zero price territories, territories with zero slots (unusable), territories with excessive boost percentages, or territories with unreasonable supply limits. The absence of reasonable bounds checking creates significant economic governance risks, as territory types with extreme parameter values could disrupt the game's balance, undermine player experience, and create unfair advantages. Additionally, the function permits empty name strings, which could lead to display and identification issues.

low Issues | 1 findings

Acknowledged

#1 low Issue
Missing REGISTRY_MANAGER_ROLE Assignment in TerritoryRegistry Constructor
TerritoryRegistry.sol
L54-60
Description

The TerritoryRegistry contract defines a REGISTRY_MANAGER_ROLE that is required to call the critical recordMint function, which tracks territory minting and enforces supply limits. However, the constructor fails to assign this role to any address, including the admin. This creates a post-deployment vulnerability where the territory minting functionality remains completely inaccessible until an admin manually grants the role in a separate transaction. If admin access is compromised before this role is assigned, the contract's primary functionality of recording territory mints would be permanently disabled, breaking a core mechanic of the game ecosystem.

informational Issues | 2 findings

Acknowledged

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
TerritoryRegistry.sol
L3
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

Acknowledged

#2 informational Issue
Missing emit
TerritoryRegistry.sol
L286-300
Description

It is recommended to emit all the parameter changes.