Harbor Finance Info
Harbor Finance is a high-performance, gamified DeFi ecosystem that seamlessly merges NFT-based asset structures, sustainable passive income strategies, and immersive financial gameplay. Our mission: to make automated earning not just simple, but genuinely enjoyable. Engineer intricate Yield Items. Harvest $FISH. Collect ongoing incentives. Rise through the ranks as a master-class Fishercat.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
PublicSale.sol
-
The owner can set the Merkle root for whitelist verification (setMerkleRoot). -
The owner can modify the sale start time and duration even after the sale has started (setStartTimeAndDuration). -
The owner can withdraw collected funds after the sale ends (withdrawFunds). -
The owner can withdraw all collected funds after the sale ends (withdrawAllFunds). -
The owner can enable the sale (enableSale). -
The owner can update the funds receiver address (setFundsReceiver).
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Harbor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Harbor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
Unrestricted Sale Schedule Modification.
The setStartTimeAndDuration function allows the owner to arbitrarily change both the start time and duration of the public sale with no restrictions. Unlike the EarlyTokenRedeemer's time parameters which at least prevent changes after vesting has started, this function has no timing constraints or validation at all. This unrestricted ability to change core sale parameters creates significant uncertainty for participants and gives the owner excessive control over the sale process.
low Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Missing Parameter Validation in Constructor
The PublicSale contract's constructor lacks essential validation for multiple parameters. There are no zero-address checks for critical addresses like _eToken and _fundsReceiver, which could lead to funds being lost if accidentally set to address(0). There's no validation that _startTime is in the future, potentially allowing sales to start immediately upon deployment rather than at the intended time. Economic parameters like _price and _priceQuote aren't verified to be greater than zero, which could break core sale functionality. Additionally, _minInvest isn't checked against _totalraiseCap to ensure logical coherence, and _totalraiseCap isn't validated to be a reasonable, positive value.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
Missing emit.
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.