Discovery Trending Launches KYC Verified Watchlist Risk Alerts
Token Minter AI Threat Detection Token Burner
Blog & News Docs Visit SolidProof.io

GoldFinger Info

goldfinger.finance

GoldFinger is an innovative platform committed to bridging premium yield-generating real-world assets (RWA) with the Web3 ecosystem. The convergence of blockchain technology and traditional finance is reshaping how real-world assets (RWA) are accessed, managed, and traded. By leveraging decentralized networks, transparency, and programmable smart contracts, it is now possible to unlock the liquidity and efficiency of high-quality, yield-generating assets—such as commodities, real estate, and financial instruments—within the Web3 ecosystem.

GoldFinger Logo
Onboarded date 12/11/2025

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

18.69
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/11/13
Revision date 2025/11/13

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can update the price oracle and registry contract address.
  • The owner can update the stablecoin recipient address.
  • The owner can toggle the KYC functionality in the contract.
  • The owner or admin can toggle the mint and burn functionality with stablecoin in the contract.
  • The owner can add or remove admins from the contract.
  • The owner or admin can mark the redemption process as completed after submitting the transaction hash.
  • The owner can cancel the pending redemption.
  • The owner or admin can pause the minting and redemption of stablecoin functionality in the contract.
  • The owner can unpause the minting and redemption of stablecoin functionality in the contract.
  • The owner can rescue tokens and ETH from the contract.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the ARTVault smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the GoldFinger team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

/

State variables
public

/

Total lines
of code

/

Capabilities
Hover on items

/

Findings and Audit result

Critical
2
High
2
Medium
1
Low
Optimization
Informational
high Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 high Issue
Redemption Completion is Unverifiable On-Chain, Creating Full Counterparty Risk
ARTVault.sol
L544-595
Description

The contract's redemption mechanism is a two-step process where a user's ARTTokens are burned on-chain, but the corresponding stablecoin payout is handled off-chain. The completeRedeem function allows an administrator to finalize this process by providing a txHash string as proof of payment. However, the _validateAndRecordTxHash function only checks that this string is not empty and has not been used before; it has no ability to validate that the hash corresponds to a real, successful, and correct blockchain transaction. This design allows an administrator to mark a redemption as "Completed" with a fraudulent, irrelevant, or failed transaction hash. Since the user's tokens are already destroyed, they are placed in a position of complete trust, with no on-chain recourse if the off-chain payment fails or is never made. This architecture negates the trustless nature of smart contracts and exposes users to total loss of funds during the redemption process.

Comments

The redemption process should be re-architected to be atomic and trustless by handling the entire transaction on-chain. The ARTVault should be the custodian of the stablecoin collateral. The redemption function should be a single, atomic operation that both burns the user's ARTTokens and immediately executes a safeTransfer of the stablecoins from the vault contract directly to the user. If the stablecoin transfer fails for any reason, the entire transaction should revert, ensuring the user's ARTTokens are not destroyed. This is the only model that guarantees a user will receive their funds and eliminates the severe counterparty risk present in the current design.

Pending

#2 high Issue
Architectural Conflict Permanently Traps All On-Chain Collateral
ARTVault.sol
L1-858
Description

The ARTVault contract contains a fatal architectural contradiction between its minting and redeeming mechanisms. The minting process is designed for on-chain custody, where user-deposited stablecoins (USDT/USDC) are transferred to and held by the ARTVault contract as collateral. However, the redeeming process is designed for an off-chain settlement model, where the contract burns a user's ARTTokens but has no function to transfer the now-trapped stablecoin collateral back out to the user. This conflict ensures that if the contract is used as designed (i.e., holding its own collateral for transparency), any and all funds deposited will be permanently and irreversibly locked. There is a mechanism for funds to enter the contract, but no mechanism for them to ever leave, effectively turning the vault into a black hole for user capital.

Comments

This fundamental design flaw requires a complete re-architecture of the redemption process and its interaction with administrative functions. A two-part mitigation is required to create a secure and functional on-chain settlement system: 1) Implement Atomic On-Chain Redemptions: The off-chain settlement model (_submitRedeem, completeRedeem, etc.) must be removed entirely. It should be replaced with a single, atomic redemption function. This new function must perform two actions in the same transaction: first, burn the user's ARTTokens, and second, execute an immediate safeTransfer of the corresponding stablecoin collateral from the ARTVault contract directly to the user. This ensures that the redemption of the RWA token is verifiably and trustlessly linked to the payout of its underlying collateral. 2) Secure the Collateral from Administrative Withdrawal: Once the vault is redesigned to hold the collateral, the rescueERC20 function becomes a critical backdoor for the owner to steal those funds. To close this vector, the rescueERC20 function must be modified to explicitly forbid the withdrawal of the core collateral tokens. It should be updated with a require statement such as: require(token != address(usdt) && token != address(usdc), "Cannot rescue collateral tokens");. This vital check ensures the function can still be used for its intended purpose of recovering accidentally sent assets without compromising the integrity of the collateral pool.

medium Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 medium Issue
Lack of Contract Validation for Critical Dependencies
ARTVault.sol
L366-371
L373-378
Description

The owner-privileged functions setPriceOracle and setRegistry allow for the modification of the ARTVault's core dependencies. These addresses are expected to be functional smart contracts that handle price data and KYC verification. However, these functions critically lack any validation to ensure that the new addresses being set are indeed deployed smart contracts and not regular wallet addresses (EOAs). A single mistake, such as a copy-paste error by the owner, could assign an EOA to one of these roles. This would cause all subsequent calls to the oracle or registry to fail, permanently breaking all minting, redeeming, and KYC-gated functionality. This vulnerability creates a high-severity, single point of failure that could render the entire protocol inoperable.

Comments

To prevent this catastrophic operational failure, a multi-layered defense is required. First, as an immediate fix, both setPriceOracle and setRegistry must be modified to include a contract existence check (e.g., require(address.code.length > 0)). This provides a crucial line of defense against accidental errors. Second, to address the underlying centralization risk, the power to change these critical addresses should be removed from the direct control of the owner and placed under a formal governance mechanism. The best practice is to implement a time lock contract, where any proposed change to the oracle or registry addresses is announced publicly on-chain and can only be executed after a significant delay (e.g., 2-7 days), giving users time to review the change and exit the system if necessary. This transforms a risky, instantaneous action into a transparent and predictable upgrade process.

Pending

#2 medium Issue
Missing validation for minimum amount.
ARTVault.sol
L689-691
Description

The setMinimumAmount function allows an owner or admin to change the minimumAmount required for minting and redeeming. However, this function lacks any validation or sanity check to ensure the new minimum is a reasonable value. A malicious or compromised administrator could call this function and set the minimumAmount to an astronomically high number (e.g., type(uint256).max). This action would cause the require(usdGross < minimumAmount) check in both the minting and redeeming functions to fail for every conceivable transaction, effectively and silently freezing all deposits and withdrawals for the protocol. This provides a "soft rug" vector where administrators can trap all user funds in the contract without ever having to pause it.

Comments

To prevent this potential denial-of-service attack, the setMinimumAmount function must be constrained. A reasonable upper limit, or MAX_MINIMUM_AMOUNT, should be introduced as a constant in the contract. The function should then be modified to include a require statement that prevents the new minimum from being set higher than this predefined ceiling (e.g., require(newMinimum <= MAX_MINIMUM_AMOUNT, "Minimum amount too high")). This ensures that while administrators have the flexibility to adjust the parameter, they cannot use it as a weapon to unilaterally halt the core functionality of the vault.

low Issues | 1 findings

Pending

#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic.
ARTVault.sol
L689-691
Description

It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
ARTVault.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.