GoldFinger Info
GoldFinger is an innovative platform committed to bridging premium yield-generating real-world assets (RWA) with the Web3 ecosystem. The convergence of blockchain technology and traditional finance is reshaping how real-world assets (RWA) are accessed, managed, and traded. By leveraging decentralized networks, transparency, and programmable smart contracts, it is now possible to unlock the liquidity and efficiency of high-quality, yield-generating assets—such as commodities, real estate, and financial instruments—within the Web3 ecosystem.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner can mint
It is possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can add or remove admins from the contract.
- The owner can add minters in the contract.
- The owner can remove minters from the contract.
- The minters can mint tokens to any recipient wallet, not more than the maximum total supply.
- The owner or admins can pause the token transfer for an indefinite period of time.
- The owner can unpause the token transfer.
- The owner can rescue stuck tokens and ETH from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the GFToken smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the GoldFinger team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Administrators Can Unilaterally Burn Tokens From Any Blacklisted Address
The burnBlacklisted function allows an owner or admin to destroy GFTokens directly from any address that has been blacklisted, without requiring any consent or allowance from the token holder. This functionality constitutes a direct seizure of user funds. A malicious or compromised administrator could abuse this power by first blacklisting a user and then immediately destroying their entire balance, effectively stealing their assets. This creates an extreme form of custodial risk that undermines the principle of self-custody.
medium Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Centralized and Indefinite Pausing Power Creates Full Custodial Risk
The pause function allows an owner or admin to instantly and unilaterally halt all GFToken transfers across the entire protocol for an indefinite period. This function effectively transforms the token from a self-custodial asset into a custodial one, where users' ability to access their funds is contingent on the actions of a central administrator. This creates a significant risk that a compromised or malicious admin could hold the entire ecosystem's assets hostage.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Centralized, Indefinite Blacklisting Poses Custodial Risk
The setBlacklisted function grants owner and admin accounts the unilateral power to freeze any user's GFToken assets for an indefinite period. The protocol lacks any on-chain governance, appeal process, or time limit for these actions. This gives administrators a level of custodial control that is inappropriate for a decentralized asset, as they can effectively block users from accessing their funds permanently and without recourse.
Acknowledged
#3 medium Issue
Centralized Control Over Token Emission
The addMinter function is an onlyOwner privileged function, granting the owner the sole power to designate which addresses can mint new GFTokens up to the maximum supply. This creates a severe centralization risk, as a malicious or compromised owner could assign the minter role to their own address, mint the entire remaining token supply, and then sell these tokens on the open market, thereby crashing the token's value and harming all other holders.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.