GeoLeaf Info
GeoLeaf is a mission-driven platform dedicated to tackling global water scarcity by leveraging blockchain technology. Through staking, project owners can create custom pools that attract investors, while both parties contribute to sustainable water solutions for communities in need. GeoLeaf combines financial growth with social impact, ensuring every token staked supports accessible, clean water initiatives worldwide.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the marketing, donation, LP wallet address to any arbitrary address, including zero.
- The owner can pause/unpause all token transfers (transfer, transferFrom) and all functions that execute swaps and distributions.
- The owner can update the GL to BNB, BNBtoXRP, and XRP distribution threshold value to any arbitrary value.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the GeoLeaf smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the GeoLeaf team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 6 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
The owner can lock tokens.
The GeoTest.sol contract grants the owner the unilateral and immediate authority to call the pause() function. This action engages the whenNotPaused modifier on the core transfer and transferFrom functions, effectively halting all token transfers and freezing the assets of every holder. This creates a significant centralization risk, as a compromised or malicious owner could trap all user funds within the contract indefinitely, without any warning or recourse for the community. Such power undermines trust and exposes investors to the risk of a single point of failure.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Missing 'require' check. (Potential honeypot)
The owner can set any arbitrary address to the marketing wallet, donation wallet, and lp wallet address, including zero address as this can lead to a potential honeypot if the owner has set the address to a contract address that cannot receive ETH. It is recommended that the address cannot be set to a contract address that cannot receive ETH to avoid these circumstances.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Lack of Input Validation on Threshold Setters
The functions setGLToBNBThreshold, setBNBToXRPThreshold, and setXRPDistributionThreshold allow the owner to change critical thresholds that control the timing and execution of swaps and reward distributions. However, these functions lack any input validation. A malicious or careless owner could set these thresholds to zero or an extremely high value. Setting a threshold to zero could cause swaps to execute with negligible amounts, wasting gas and creating dust outputs. Conversely, setting a threshold to an impossibly high number would effectively disable the automatic swap and distribution mechanism, causing tax tokens to accumulate indefinitely without being processed.
Pending
#4 medium Issue
The owner can lock transfer via setMaxTxPercent
The setMaxTxPercent function allows the owner to adjust the maximum transaction amount (_maxTxAmount). A critical vulnerability exists because this function lacks input validation. If the owner calls setMaxTxPercent(0), _maxTxAmount will be set to zero. Since every user transfer is checked with require(amount <= _maxTxAmount), all subsequent transfer attempts by regular users will fail, effectively freezing all trading and locking user assets in a honeypot-like situation.
Pending
#5 medium Issue
Liquidity is added to externally owned address.
The contract's liquidity is automatically added to the 'lpWallet' address, which is not recommended because, in an extreme scenario, this can be used to drain liquidity from the contract.
Pending
#6 medium Issue
Unbounded Loop Creates Inevitable Denial of Service (DoS)
The contract's design for managing token holders and distributing rewards relies on iterating through a dynamically-sized array. The gas cost of these operations scales linearly with the number of holders. As the user base grows, the gas required to execute these loops will inevitably exceed the network's block gas limit. This will render critical functions, such as distributeXRPRewards, permanently inoperable, halting all reward distributions. It will also cause transactions to fail for users whose actions trigger removeHolder, effectively freezing certain contract interactions and creating a Denial of Service condition based on normal contract growth.
low Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Remove safemath library
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Local variables shadowing (shadowing-local)
Rename the local variables that shadow another component.
Pending
#3 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
Emit all the critical parameter changes.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
Remove unused code.