GenZ Info
GENZVerse represents a new paradigm in Web3 platforms, combining cutting-edge blockchain technology with user-centric design to create an ecosystem that is both powerful and accessible. Our mission is to bridge the gap between complex blockchain technology and mainstream adoption, making Web3 accessible to everyone while maintaining the core principles of decentralization, security, and transparency.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the GNZ token address only once.
- The owner can propose a new business contract address.
- The owner can execute a pending business contract change after the 2-day timelock has elapsed.
- The owner can cancel a pending business contract proposal before execution.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the GenZReservePool smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the GenZ team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
releaseDaily() Has No Access Control
releaseDaily() at line 114 has no access modifier — any Ethereum address can call it at any time after unlockTime. When called, tokens transfer to owner at line 134, not to businessContract where they are needed for user package claim backing. The businessContract field at line 52 has a full propose-execute-cancel timelock governance system at lines 69–112, but this address is never referenced in any state-changing function — the entire governance infrastructure is dead code. Additionally, the geometric decay formula at line 125 (currentBalance × 0.3% × daysPassed) asymptotically approaches but never reaches zero, leaving a permanently unreleasable dust amount once currentBalance × 3 / 1000 < 1 in raw token units.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Permanently Frozen Ownership
address public pendingOwner is declared at line 14 and event OwnershipTransferInitiated(address indexed currentOwner, address indexed pendingOwner) is declared at line 42. No transferOwnership() or acceptOwnership() function exists anywhere in GenZReservePool. The reserve pool holds 1,000,000 GNZ tokens (the protocol's entire reserve). If the deployer wallet is compromised, the attacker permanently controls setToken() (can redirect token reference), proposeBusinessContract() / executeBusinessContractChange() (can change release destination through timelock), and can repeatedly trigger releaseDaily()) to drain the reserve to the compromised owner address. No on-chain recovery exists.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#3 informational Issue
OwnershipTransferInitiated Event Declared but Can Never Be Emitted
pendingOwner at line 14 and OwnershipTransferInitiated at line 42 were declared for an ownership transfer pattern that was never implemented. No function writes to pendingOwner or calls emit OwnershipTransferInitiated. The variable is always zero, the event is permanently silent, and the storage slot is wasted.