GenZ Info
GENZVerse represents a new paradigm in Web3 platforms, combining cutting-edge blockchain technology with user-centric design to create an ecosystem that is both powerful and accessible. Our mission is to bridge the gap between complex blockchain technology and mainstream adoption, making Web3 accessible to everyone while maintaining the core principles of decentralization, security, and transparency.
TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can propose a new DEX pair address.
- The owner can execute a pending DEX pair change after the 2-day timelock has elapsed.
- The owner can cancel a pending DEX pair proposal before it is executed, deleting the timelock entry.
- The owner can initiate a two-step ownership transfer to a new address by setting pendingOwner.
- The owner can pause all token transfers and burns across the entire protocol.
- The owner can unpause token transfers to restore all token operations.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the GenZToken smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the GenZ team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
GenZToken pause() Independently Bricks All Protocol Token Operations Across Three Contracts
pause() at lines 407–411 sets paused = true, causing the whenNotPaused modifier on transfer() at line 201 and burn() at line 271 to revert all calls with "PAUSED". These are called throughout the protocol: GenZLPController's processLP() calls token.burn() and token.transfer(); GenZVerse's buyPackageUnified() calls lp.processLP(); claimPackageTokens() calls token.transfer(); _distributeDifferentialTokens() calls token.transfer(). A single GenZToken.pause() call by the token owner freezes all purchases, all token claims, all differential distributions, and all LP operations simultaneously. Because GenZToken implements working two-step ownership transfer at lines 392–405 while GenZVerse has no ownership transfer at all, the two contracts can be independently owned by separate parties with no on-chain coordination mechanism.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Vesting Schedule Stacking — New DEX Purchases Retroactively Unlock Prior Tranches
_lockTokens() at line 146 adds amount to schedule.lockedAmount without resetting lastClaimTime, set only on the first lock at lines 143–144. _calculateClaimable() at line 170 computes lockedAmount × DAILY_RELEASE_BP × daysCount / 10000 applying the full elapsed time from lastClaimTime to the combined total. Example: 1,000 tokens locked on Day 0. On Day 100, user buys 9,000 more — lockedAmount = 10,000, elapsed = 100 days. Claimable = 10,000 × 0.003 × 100 = 3,000. Correct: 300 (first tranche) + 0 (second tranche) = 300. The extra 2,700 tokens are immediately available via _getAvailableBalance() at lines 180–199 and sellable on DEX, bypassing the intended 365-day lock.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
TIME_LOCK_DELAY = 5 minutes
The contract hardcodes TIME_LOCK_DELAY = 5 minutes; with an explicit developer comment reading // For testing. Immediately below it, the intended production value of 2 days is commented out. This timelock governs the proposeDexPair and executeDexPairChange functions. By leaving the 5-minute test value in production, the 2-day community review window is completely bypassed. For example, a malicious or compromised owner could call proposeDexPair with a fake pair address they control. Just 5 minutes later, they could call executeDexPairChange. The new fake pair address instantly receives isExemptFromVesting = true. The attacker can then funnel tokens through this exempted fake pair to bypass the 365-day vesting lock on the mainnet entirely, dumping tokens on the market without warning.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Non-Standard ERC20 Restrictions Break Standard DeFi Integration
MAX_APPROVAL = 100_000_000 * 1e6 at line 26 causes require(amount <= MAX_APPROVAL, "APPROVAL_EXCEEDS_MAX") at line 230 to revert when any DEX UI, aggregator, or DeFi protocol calls approve(router, type(uint256).max) — the universal infinite-approval pattern. Additionally, require(spender != msg.sender, "NO_SELF_APPROVE") at line 229 rejects self-approval, blocking self-delegation patterns used in some vault implementations. transferFrom() at line 252 always decrements allowance without checking for type(uint256).max, meaning any large but non-max approval is consumed per-use rather than behaving as infinite.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Unbounded vestingTranches Array — Gas DoS on All GNZ Transfers
Every time a user buys GNZ from the dexPair during the 365-day vesting window, the _lockTokens function pushes a new VestingTranche struct into the vestingTranches[buyer] array. There is absolutely no limit on how large this array can grow. Because functions like transfer(), transferFrom(), and updateVestingClaim() must iterate through this entire array to calculate _getTotalStillLocked(), a massive array will consume more gas than the block limit allows. For example, if an attacker (or even a high-frequency trading bot) makes 10,000 separate tiny $1 purchases of GNZ on a low-gas chain like Polygon, their vestingTranches array will contain 10,000 entries. If they later attempt to transfer their tokens, the loop iterating 10,000 times will exceed the block gas limit, and the transaction will revert with an "Out of Gas" error. Their tokens will be permanently frozen and untransferable.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
VestingExemptionSet Event Declared but No Setter Function Exists
event VestingExemptionSet(address indexed account, bool exempt) is declared but no setVestingExemption() function exists. The isExemptFromVesting mapping is set only in the constructor for the four initial addresses and can never be updated. New contract addresses from business contract updates cannot be exempted from vesting, potentially causing operational failures in upgraded contract versions.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
New Owner Not Added to Vesting Exemption After acceptOwnership
The acceptOwnership function successfully removes the vesting exemption from the previous owner (isExemptFromVesting[owner] = false), but it completely fails to grant the exemption to the new incoming owner. The contract constructor explicitly grants the original owner this exemption (isExemptFromVesting[owner] = true), establishing the protocol's intent that the active owner should not be subject to the 365-day DEX vesting lock. For example, if the deployer transfers ownership to a secure Multisig wallet on Day 30, the old deployer correctly loses their exemption. However, the new Multisig wallet never receives the exemption. If the Multisig later purchases or receives tokens during the 365-day lock period, those tokens will be unexpectedly locked and subject to the daily 0.3% vesting schedule, potentially locking up critical protocol liquidity.