TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

55.36
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/05/01
Revision date 2025/05/01

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can set the influencer commission to any arbitrary value in the contract.
  • The owner can toggle the sale's active status.
  • The owner can enable/disable fixed price mode and set the fixed token price in USD.
  • The owner can set custom start times for any ICO stage.
  • The owner can add addresses to the whitelist, allowing them to distribute tokens via card payments.
  • The owner can withdraw native ETH from the contract at any time.
  • The owner can withdraw any ERC20 token (including the ICO token) from the contract anytime.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Future PEPE smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Future PEPE team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 4 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Missing Token Cap Enforcement in Purchase
pepeEthIco.sol
L602-621
Description

The buyWithNative, buyWithUSDT, and buyWithCard functions all lack verification against totalTokenCap (175M tokens). These functions only check if the contract has enough tokens for the current transaction (token.balanceOf(address(this)) >= tokenAmount) but never validate whether the sale would exceed the intended ICO cap when incrementing totalTokenSold or totalTokenSoldByCard. This could allow selling more tokens than allocated for the ICO.

Acknowledged

#2 medium Issue
Arbitrary Price Manipulation by owner mid-sale.
pepeEthIco.sol
L778-785
Description

The setUseFixedPrice function allows the contract owner to change token pricing at any point during the active ICO by toggling between staged and fixed pricing modes or by setting any arbitrary fixed price. This unrestricted ability to modify pricing terms without prior notice creates significant centralization risks, potentially enabling unfair price manipulation that favors specific buyers or disadvantages others. Investors expecting consistent pricing could face unexpected changes mid-sale, undermining trust and fairness.

Acknowledged

#3 medium Issue
Owner Can Manipulate ICO Timing Mid-Sale
pepeEthIco.sol
L856-860
Description

The setCustomStageStartTime function allows the contract owner to modify the start time of any ICO stage at any point during the active sale. The owner can set any timestamp, including past dates or future dates, which directly affects token pricing since prices increase with each successive stage. This creates substantial centralization risks, as the owner could unexpectedly advance stages to increase prices, revert to earlier stages with lower prices, or extend favorable pricing periods to benefit specific investors. No timelock or advance notice is required for these changes, undermining the predictability and fairness of the ICO schedule.

Acknowledged

#4 medium Issue
Owner Can Drain ICO Tokens Using withdrawToken Function.
pepeEthIco.sol
L939-944
Description

The withdrawToken function allows the contract owner to withdraw any amount of any ERC20 token from the contract, including the ICO token itself. There are no restrictions preventing the owner from withdrawing unsold tokens allocated for the sale, essentially draining the contract and making it impossible for users to purchase tokens. The function only checks if the contract has the requested balance, but doesn't validate whether those tokens are reserved for the ongoing ICO. This gives the owner unlimited power to remove tokens at any time, even during an active sale, creating a significant centralization risk and trust requirement.

low Issues | 3 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Unbounded Influencer Commission Values
pepeEthIco.sol
L553-567
Description

The setInfluencerCommission function allows the owner to set arbitrary commission percentages without any upper limit. When commission values exceed 100%, purchase transactions attempting to calculate (payment * commission) / 100 would try to pay more than the received amount, causing transaction failures. Even with values below 100%, excessively high commissions could redirect nearly all funds to influencers instead of the admin wallet, potentially functioning as a backdoor mechanism.

Resolved

#2 low Issue
Missing Zero Address Validation
pepeEthIco.sol
L553-567
Description

The function doesn't check if influencer != address(0) before assigning commission, Setting commission for the zero address could lead to unintended behavior.

Resolved

#3 low Issue
No Zero-Value Commission Skip
pepeEthIco.sol
L602-621
Description

The buyWithNative and buyWithUSDT functions process referral commissions without checking if the commission percentage is greater than zero. When commissions[referrer] is 0%, the contract still executes unnecessary operations: calculating zero amounts, making external calls to transfer 0 ETH/USDT, performing oracle price calculations, and updating storage values unnecessarily. This wastes gas on meaningless operations, particularly the costly external calls. Mitigation: Add a validation check to skip commission processing when the rate is zero: if(isReferral[referrer] && commissions[referrer] > 0) { /* process commission */ }. If token sale tracking is still desired for zero-commission referrers, maintain only that operation in an else clause.

informational Issues | 2 findings

Resolved

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
pepeEthIco.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

Resolved

#2 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
pepeEthIco.sol
L37
L51
L55
L187
L192
L336
L342
Description

Remove unused code.