Fruit Forest Adventure Info
Fruit Forest Adventure (FFA) offers players a fresh and exciting entertainment experience by combining electronic gaming with blockchain technology. Players will explore a colorful world filled with engaging challenges and quests. FFA leverages blockchain technology to ensure transparency and security in all transactions and activities. This provides peace of mind for players when participating and transacting within the FFA ecosystem. FFA is not just an entertainment game but also offers income-earning opportunities for players and investors. Through in-game activities and special promotional programs, players can earn valuable rewards and increase their income.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner can mint
It is possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can mint tokens up to the capped supply (if access control is implemented).
- The owner can initialize the total token supply at deployment.
Security Observations
- The `mint` function is publicly accessible, but it is effectively capped by the initial total supply minted in the constructor.
- Unused imports (e.g., `Ownable.sol`, `ERC20Burnable.sol`, `console.sol`) increase the contract size unnecessarily.
- No custom events are emitted for minting operations, reducing traceability.
- The `cap` variable is redundant and should leverage OpenZeppelin's `ERC20Capped` for better clarity.
Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the FruitForestAdventure smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the FruitForestAdventure project. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend project stakeholders conduct further testing and that investors do their own research before participating in the project.
Files and details
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing Access Control on Minting Function
The mint function allows any address to mint tokens up to the defined cap limit. However, since the entire cap is minted in the constructor at deployment, the cap is effectively reached immediately, rendering the mint function inoperable unless tokens are burned or a mechanism to reduce the total supply is introduced. This limits the potential for supply inflation but creates unnecessary complexity and confusion.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Outdated OpenZeppelin Version Used
The contract imports an older version of OpenZeppelin libraries (openzeppelin-solidity), which is deprecated and no longer maintained. This poses a security risk, as the older library versions do not benefit from recent optimizations, features, and vulnerability patches. Additionally, the outdated library may not be fully compatible with the specified Solidity compiler version (0.8.20). The contract specifies the Solidity compiler version 0.8.20, but the imported OpenZeppelin libraries may require a different version. Such discrepancies can lead to build errors or unexpected behavior during deployment.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Redundant Cap Variable Without Getter
The cap variable is manually defined and enforced, but there is no getter function to expose the cap value for external users. This could cause confusion and reduce transparency. Also, the cap variable is declared without an explicit visibility specifier. This defaults to private, which might not be intuitive to other developers.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Unused Imports in Contract Code
The contract imports Ownable.sol, ERC20Burnable.sol, and console.sol, which are not used in the code. This increases the contract's size unnecessarily and may confuse developers reviewing the code. The console.sol import is included in the contract, which is used for debugging purposes during development. This is unnecessary and should not be part of production deployments.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Missing Appropriate SPDX License Identifier
The contract uses the UNLICENSED SPDX identifier, indicating it is not open-source or permissively licensed. This can create legal and compliance issues if the contract is deployed publicly.