The reclaimTokens function contains a critical logic flaw that allows investors to withdraw their funds from a campaign that has already successfully met its funding goal. The function incorrectly permits reclamation during the reclaimWindow even if the campaign was successful, which fundamentally undermines the commitment of a fundraising event. For example, consider a successful campaign that ends on November 15th with a 7-day reclaim window. An investor can call reclaimTokens on November 17th. The function's check if (hasReachedLimit) will be true, and the subsequent check require(block.timestamp <= fundraising.endDate + feeConfig.reclaimWindow) will also pass, as November 17th is within the reclaim period. The contract then proceeds to return the investor's full contribution. This allows investors to back out of a successful project, creating uncertainty for the project owner and potentially causing the total funds raised to drop below the minimum threshold after the fact.

The getChainlinkDataFeedLatestAnswer function fetches the price from a Chainlink data feed but fails to check if the price is recent or if the round was valid. If an oracle reports a stale price or a price of zero, the invest functions will use this incorrect price, which can lead to catastrophic miscalculations of investment amounts.For example, an oracle for USDC/USD stops updating. Its last price was $1. The real price of USDC crashes to $0.10. The contract will use the stale price of $1 and require 10x more ETH from an investor than it should, causing a significant loss for the user.

The ForcefiBaseContract constructor sets the owner using Ownable(tx.origin). If the deployment is performed through a contract (like a multisig wallet), the owner will be set to the original user who started the transaction, not the deploying contract. This can lead to loss of ownership or ownership being assigned to an unintended, single address.

The createFundraising function does not validate that _tgePercent is less than or equal to 100. If a value > 100 is used, the vesting calculation in computeReleasableAmount will attempt an integer underflow (invested - tgeCalculatedAmount), which will always revert. This makes it impossible for any investor in that campaign to ever claim their vested tokens.

The createFundraising function lacks essential validation checks on the _fundraisingData input, which allows a project owner to create a campaign that is logically flawed or non-functional from its inception. Specifically, the function fails to ensure that critical parameters make sense in relation to each other or to fundamental rules. For example, a user can set the _rateDelimiter to zero, which will cause a division-by-zero error in every investment transaction, permanently blocking any funds from being raised. Similarly, the _campaignMinTicketLimit can be set higher than the _campaignMaxTicketLimit, creating an impossible condition where no valid investment can ever be made. The function also fails to verify that the _startDate occurs before the _endDate, allowing for the creation of campaigns with illogical timelines.

The function uses try/catch blocks to handle the transfer of native currency (ETH) fees to the staking and curator contracts. The comment states that if the transfer fails, "the fee remains with campaign owner." This logic is implemented by only incrementing distributedFees on a successful transfer. The final payout to the campaign owner is totalFundraisedInWei - distributedFees. Therefore, if a fee transfer fails, the distributedFees amount is lower, and the amountToSender (the campaign owner's payout) becomes larger, effectively redirecting the failed fee payment to the owner. This creates a perverse incentive for a campaign owner to use staking or curator contracts that are intentionally designed to not accept ETH, allowing the owner to pocket those fees.