Finger Monkeys Info

FingerMonkeys is a gamified platform where the ambassadors upload simple mini games, while players enjoy a TikTok-inspired experience of scrolling through those games, playing and earning FingerMonkeys token. Ambassadors can acquire licenses through nodes, giving them the tools and authority to contribute directly to the ecosystem. Players, in turn, are rewarded with FMT tokens, fueling a dynamic and vibrant token economy. Over time, the platform will evolve from a structured system into a fully decentralized ecosystem governed by the ambassador DAO, ensuring community-driven growth and innovation.

Finger Monkeys Logo

Team and KYC Verification

The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.

In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

59.23
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/05/09
Revision date 2025/05/09

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is renounced

The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can permanently lock stake imports.
  • The owner can create arbitrary stake positions for any address with custom parameters.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the FM/DTC smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the FM/DTC team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
of code

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Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 2 findings

Acknowledged

#1 medium Issue
Reward Calculation Discrepancy in importStakes Function
Staking.sol
L54-87
Description

The importStakes function calculates rewards using a divisor of 10000 (_amounts[i].mul(rewardRate).div(10000)), while the regular stake function uses a divisor of 100 (amount.mul(rewardRate).div(100)). Both functions use the same getRewardRate() function that returns identical reward rate constants. This inconsistency causes imported stakes to receive only 1/100th of the rewards compared to regular stakes with identical parameters.

Acknowledged

#2 medium Issue
Precision Loss in Reward Calculation
Staking.sol
L101-116
Description

The function calculates rewards using integer division (amount.mul(rewardRate).div(100)), which truncates fractional results. Small stake amounts can result in zero rewards even when they should receive a non-zero amount. For example, staking one token with a 2% rate would calculate as 12/100=0, effectively denying legitimate rewards.

low Issues | 1 findings

Acknowledged

#1 low Issue
Remove safemath library
Staking.sol
L10
Description

The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Acknowledged

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Staking.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.