Five Pillar Info
The Five Pillars Token ecosystem is a comprehensive DeFi investment platform built on Ethereum, featuring a native ERC-20 token with advanced tokenomics, multi-tier reward systems, referral mechanisms, and pool-based investment strategies. The system consists of two main contracts that work together to create a sustainable investment ecosystem.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
InvestmentManager.sol
- The owner can set the deposit fees to not more than 10%.
- The owner can set the claim fees to not more than 10%.
- The owner can manually add or remove any user from the exclusive, high-reward Pools 7 and 8.
- The owner can change the rules (e.g., personal deposit amount, referral count) required to enter the standard reward pools (Pools 0 through 6).
- The owner can propose a new address to take over ownership of the contract.
- The owner can permanently renounce their ownership, which would make all administrative functions unusable forever.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Five Pillar smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Five Pillar team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Slippage & Deadline Vulnerability in DEX Fee Swap
The _trySendFees function, which is called by both deposit and claimReward, contains a critical vulnerability in its interaction with the PancakeSwap router. When calling the swapExactTokensForETH function, the amountOutMin parameter is hardcoded to 1, and the deadline parameter is set to block.timestamp. This configuration signals to the network that the contract is willing to accept as little as 1 wei of ETH in exchange for the entire balance of collected fee tokens. This creates a guaranteed and highly profitable opportunity for automated MEV (Miner Extractable Value) bots to execute a "Sandwich Attack." These bots will see the vulnerable transaction in the mempool, manipulate the token's price to their advantage before the swap, and then restore it afterward, draining nearly 100% of the value from the fee transaction and leaving the protocol's treasury with virtually nothing. The use of block.timestamp as a deadline further empowers miners to execute this attack at the most opportune moment. This is not a potential risk; it is a certainty that will lead to the systematic and total loss of all protocol fee revenue.
informational Issues | 4 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
Unsafe Downcasting of Timestamp (The "Year 2106 Bug")
The InvestmentManager.sol contract is subject to a critical vulnerability known as the "Year 2106 Bug" due to the unsafe downcasting of timestamps. The issue lies in storing block.timestamp, a uint256 value, into smaller uint32 state variables for tracking user actions. A uint32 can only represent timestamps up to February 7th, 2106, after which it will overflow and wrap around to zero, causing all time-based calculations for deposit delays and reward accrual to fail catastrophically and break the contract's core logic.
Resolved
#3 informational Issue
Precision Loss in Reward Calculations
The contract's reward calculation logic consistently uses standard integer division, which truncates any remainders. This occurs in multiple places, such as when calculating daily rewards or distributing pool rewards among participants (e.g., reward / participantsCount). While this does not pose a direct security vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker, it leads to a minor but systemic loss of value. In every calculation where the reward amount is not perfectly divisible by the number of participants or the basis points, a tiny fraction of a token (often referred to as "dust") is not allocated. This unallocated dust remains in the contract's balance but is untracked by the internal accounting, effectively becoming locked and unrecoverable.
Acknowledged
#4 informational Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.