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ETHVenom Info

ethvenom.com

ETH VENOM ($EVN) is a next-generation community-driven crypto project built on Ethereum, designed around transparency, rule-based mechanics, and long-term sustainability. The project introduces a deterministic deflationary model where token supply reduction is directly linked to Ethereum’s price growth, enforced fully on-chain without manual intervention. Inspired by ancient mythology, serpents, and gladiator trials, ETH VENOM combines strong branding with real utility, predictable tokenomics, and community governance.

ETHVenom Logo
Onboarded date 05/01/2026

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

45.70
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0xdFf0...BB6c
Network
Ethereum - Mainnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2026/01/05
Revision date 2026/01/05

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can reinitialize the contract.
  • The owner can restart the presale.
  • The owner can reset the presale.
  • The owner can do a complete reset.
  • The owner can finalize the presale.
  • The owner can end the presale.
  • The owner can change the fundsReceiver address.
  • The owner can withdraw tokens and ETH from the contract.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the EVNPresale smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the ETHVenom team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
of code

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Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

Critical
High
1
Medium
1
Low
Optimization
2
Informational
medium Issues | 1 findings

Pending

#1 medium Issue
Re-initialization Vulnerability in initialize Function
EVNPresale.sol
L440-459
Description

The initialize function in EVNPresale.sol lacked a re-initialization guard, making it susceptible to being called multiple times by the contract owner. This vulnerability could allow an attacker, or even the legitimate owner by mistake, to reconfigure critical contract parameters such as the EVN token address, ETH/USD price feed, presale start time, and phase duration after initial deployment. Such re-initialization could lead to unexpected behavior, loss of funds, or manipulation of the presale's terms.

Comments

To mitigate this, a boolean flag named initialized was introduced. This flag is set to true only after the first successful execution of the initialize function. A require(!initialized, "Already initialized"); statement was added at the beginning of the initialize function, ensuring that any subsequent attempts to call the function will revert, thereby preventing unauthorized or accidental re-initialization of the contract's state.

low Issues | 1 findings

Pending

#1 low Issue
Financial Inconsistency and Potential Rug Pull due to totalSold Reset
EVNPresale.sol
L490-504
Description

The fullReset function, by unilaterally setting totalSold to zero, introduces a severe financial inconsistency and a high risk of a "rug pull" vulnerability. This is because, while the contract's internal record of total sales is erased, the tokens previously purchased by users remain in their wallets, and the corresponding ETH contributions remain with the fundsReceiver. This creates a misleading state where the contract indicates no sales have occurred, despite actual assets having been transferred. The danger lies in the potential for a malicious owner to exploit this by collecting funds, resetting totalSold, and then initiating a new presale, effectively disavowing previous sales without refunding participants.

Comments

To mitigate this critical flaw, it is imperative to implement a comprehensive strategy for handling prior sales. This must include either a robust refund mechanism that tracks individual ETH contributions and returns funds to buyers, or, if a complete restart is the objective, ensuring that all individual buyer purchase records are also explicitly cleared. Without these additional measures, simply resetting totalSold is an incomplete and dangerous operation that compromises the integrity of the presale and puts user funds at extreme risk.

informational Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
EVNPresale.sol
L381
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

Pending

#2 informational Issue
Use of transfer instead of SafeERC20.safeTransfer in ERC20 Token
EVNPresale.sol
L602-626
Description

The EVNPresale.sol contract currently uses the raw IERC20.transfer() function for moving EVN tokens in multiple locations, specifically on lines 620, 671, 685, and 728. This practice is discouraged in modern Solidity development due to several known vulnerabilities and edge cases associated with certain ERC20 token implementations. Some tokens might not correctly return a boolean value on transfer() (pre-ERC20 standard tokens or non-compliant ones), or they might return false without reverting, which could lead to funds being stuck or incorrect state updates if not handled meticulously. Directly calling transfer() also opens the door to potential reentrancy issues if not properly guarded, although in this contract, nonReentrant helps mitigate some of those risks.

Comments

To mitigate these risks, the contract should adopt the widely accepted best practice of using OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library and its safeTransfer() function. SafeERC20 wraps raw ERC20 calls, providing robust checks and handling for non-standard compliant tokens, ensuring that transfer() (and other ERC20 functions like transferFrom(), approve()) behave as expected. Specifically, safeTransfer() checks the return value of the underlying transfer() call and reverts the transaction if the call fails or returns false, preventing tokens from being stuck and maintaining contract integrity. Implementing SafeERC20 would require importing the library, then replacing all instances of evnToken.transfer(...) with evnToken.safeTransfer(...). This change will enhance the security and reliability of all token interactions within the EVNPresale contract.