ETHICS (JUSTICE) Info
A token for love, respect, empathy, solidarity, cooperation, justice, peace, freedom, harmony, human rights, health, education, science, research, creativity, art, literature, sustainability, environmental protection, climate protection, plant protection, animal rights, resource conservation, biodiversity, ecology, planetary protection, and a better future. Let us connect people worldwide through ethics, awareness, and responsibility—for all living beings in the universe.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner can mint
It is possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The ETHICS (JUSTICE) contract implements an ERC20 token with owner-controlled minting (capped supply), pausable transfers, burn capability, and on-chain metadata via a token URI. The contract is deployed as an EIP-1167 minimal proxy clone via the CreateMyToken factory on Ethereum mainnet. While the overall design follows common patterns on Ethereum and no critical or high-severity issues were found, a few areas need attention:
- The initialization function bypasses the zero-address ownership check by calling _transferOwnership directly instead of __Ownable_init, which could lead to a permanently ownerless contract if address(0) is passed during deployment.
- The setTokenURI function modifies on-chain state without emitting an event, making metadata changes invisible to off-chain monitoring services.
- The implementation contract does not disable initializers in its constructor, allowing anyone to call initialize() on the implementation address (no impact on live proxy clones).
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been assigned to a single address during initialization via the CreateMyToken factory. The owner retains full privileges including:
- Minting new tokens to any address up to the supply cap
- Pausing and unpausing all token transfers globally
- Modifying the token metadata URI at any time
- Transferring ownership to another address or renouncing it permanently
- No timelock or multi-signature mechanism constrains any privileged operation
- No blacklist or per-address freezing capability exists
- No fee mechanism exists - transfers move the exact specified amount
- The contract is not upgradeable - the implementation bytecode is immutable
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- ERC20Capped enforces a maximum supply limit that cannot be exceeded even by the owner
- The initializer modifier prevents re-initialization of proxy clones
- Solidity 0.8.28 provides built-in overflow/underflow protection without unchecked blocks
- Standard OpenZeppelin v5 patterns are used for access control, pausability, and token accounting
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the ETHICS (JUSTICE) smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the ETHICS (JUSTICE) team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
State Change Without Event Emission in setTokenURI
The setTokenURI function modifies on-chain state (the token URI stored in ERC-7201 namespaced storage) but neither the external function nor the internal _setTokenUri helper emits an event. Off-chain services such as block explorers, indexers, and marketplaces cannot reliably detect when the token metadata URI changes.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Unprotected Implementation Contract Initialization
The implementation contract does not have a constructor that calls _disableInitializers(). Anyone can call initialize() on the implementation contract directly, taking ownership of the implementation's own storage. For EIP-1167 minimal proxy clones this has no direct impact on live proxy instances, but it violates established proxy pattern best practices and can cause misleading state on block explorers.
Pending
#3 low Issue
Pause Modifier Indiscriminately Blocks All Token Operations
The _update override applies the whenNotPaused modifier to ALL token movements including mints and burns. When the owner pauses the contract, they also lose the ability to mint new tokens and users lose the ability to burn. If the owner needs to mint during a paused state, they must briefly unpause, creating a window where all pending transfers can also execute.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Public Functions Should Be Declared External
The functions pause(), unpause(), mint(), burn(), and setTokenURI() are all marked as public but are never called internally within the contract or any of its inherited contracts. Using external saves gas because external functions can read arguments directly from calldata instead of copying them to memory.
informational Issues | 6 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Missing burnFrom Function Limits DeFi Composability
The contract implements burn(uint256 value) allowing holders to burn their own tokens, but does not implement burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount). Third-party smart contracts or DeFi protocols that need to burn tokens on behalf of users cannot do so even with an approved allowance.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Implicit Pausable State Initialization
The initialize() function does not call __Pausable_init(). The contract relies on the implicit default value of bool in ERC-7201 namespaced storage being false (unpaused). This is a code consistency observation rather than a functional risk.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Centralized Owner Privileges Without Governance Safeguards
The contract is designed with a single-owner trust model. The owner can mint tokens up to the cap, pause and unpause all transfers globally, and change the token metadata URI. No timelock, multi-signature, or governance mechanism constrains these privileges. These are intentional design features, not implementation flaws.
Pending
#4 informational Issue
Standard ERC-20 Approve Front-Running Race Condition
The standard ERC-20 approve function is susceptible to the well-known front-running race condition where a spender may be able to spend both the old and new allowance during an allowance change. This is inherent to the ERC-20 specification and is not an implementation flaw in this contract.
Pending
#5 informational Issue
Mixed Import Origins Between Standard and Vendor OpenZeppelin
The contract imports dependencies from three distinct origins: @openzeppelin/contracts/ for Initializable, @vendor/oz/ for ERC20Capped, ERC20Base, Pausable, and Ownable, and @src/ for ERC20TokenMetadata. This mixed provenance reduces auditability since the exact vendor modifications cannot be verified solely from this repository.
Pending
#6 informational Issue
Owner Zero-Address Validation Bypass
The initialize() function calls _transferOwnership(_owner) directly instead of __Ownable_init(_owner). The vendor Ownable contract's _transferOwnership function does not guard against the zero address. If the factory or deployer passes address(0) as the owner, the contract becomes permanently ownerless, making all onlyOwner functions (mint, pause, unpause, setTokenURI, transferOwnership, renounceOwnership) permanently inaccessible with no recovery mechanism.