EonX Info
EonX AI is the first-of-its-kind KYC-enabled AI Multi-Agent Blockchain, merging the intelligence of AI with the power of community. It is built to scale, built to last, and built by all. EonX AI marks the next evolution of blockchain, powered by the world’s first intelligent currency — iEX - the Smart Token. With KYC-enabled wallets, AI-regulated supply, and a Zero Dump – Zero Pump architecture, EonX AI sets a new standard for trust, stability, and innovation in decentralised ecosystems.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the contract address that verifies if users are registered before they can claim funds.
- The owner can set parameters for a legacy accounting feature.
- The owner can authorize a single contract address to trigger referral payouts.
- The batch manager has the sole ability to create and define new reward payout batches.
- The batch manager can cancel a reward batch before it has been activated.
- The batch manager can activate a pending reward batch.
- The batch manager can stop an active reward batch.
- The owner can set the batch manager address.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the EonX smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the EonX team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
The owner can drain all funds
The sweep function is an administrative backdoor that grants the contract owner the unilateral and immediate power to withdraw the entire USDT balance of the treasury to any address of their choosing. This is a critical centralization risk that completely undermines the security of the funds held in the contract. A malicious or compromised owner can use this function to drain all assets, including the funds allocated for active Merkle claim batches and future referral payouts. If the owner executes a sweep, any subsequent attempt by a legitimate user to call the claim function will fail, as the final UST.safeTransfer call will revert due to insufficient contract balance, permanently preventing users from accessing their promised rewards.
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing check for code.length
The setSaleContract function allows the owner to set an address for the sale contract, but it fails to verify that the provided address actually contains any deployed smart contract code. An owner could accidentally set the saleContract to an Externally Owned Account (EOA) or a wallet address. If this happens, the processReferralPayout function, which is the core mechanism for distributing referral rewards, will be permanently broken. This is because the check msg.sender != saleContract will always fail, as the msg.sender (the real EonXSale contract) will never equal the saleContract address (the EOA). All legitimate attempts to process referral payouts would revert until the owner manually corrects the address.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Owner Can Block All User Claims via setCBP Function, Leading to Denial of Service
The setCBP function gives the contract owner the unilateral power to change the cbp contract address at any time. The claim function uses this cbp address to check if a user is registered before allowing them to withdraw funds. A malicious or compromised owner can exploit this by deploying a custom contract where the isRegistered function always returns false. By setting this malicious contract as the official cbp address, the owner ensures that the registration check inside the claim function will fail for every user, causing their transactions to revert. This effectively locks all funds in the treasury that are designated for Merkle claims, creating a permanent denial-of-service condition.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Missing events
It is recommended to emit all the parameter changes.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.