Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The DSNOKCustodial contract is a fallback custody wallet that receives unclaimed beneficiary allocations, holds them for a ninety day recovery window, and then sweeps anything unclaimed to the platform treasury.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been assigned to a single operator address, currently the deployer wallet rather than the intended multi-sig. The owner retains full privileges including:
- Approving and executing recovery claims to a chosen recipient within the ninety day window.
- Sweeping expired holdings to the platform treasury after the window closes.
- Performing an emergency withdrawal of arbitrary funds while the contract is paused.
- Pausing and unpausing the contract and setting the treasury address.
- The operator cannot record new fallback holdings; only the disbursement contract can.
- The operator cannot recover funds after the ninety day window has expired through the normal flow.
- The operator cannot extend a holding's recovery deadline once it is set.
- The operator role, once transferred, follows a single-step handover with no built-in confirmation.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- Only the registered disbursement contract may record fallback holdings.
- An on-chain ninety day recovery window is enforced per owner and token before any treasury sweep.
- Recovery uses a two-step approve then execute pattern and follows a checks-effects-interactions order with reentrancy protection.
- The normal recovery, sweep and fallback paths emit events for auditability. Note that the emergency withdrawal path does not emit an event, which is raised as a separate finding.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the DSNOKCustodial smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the D-SNOK team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Operator can redirect recovery funds to any address with no delay
approveRecovery lets the operator name any recipient and amount up to the holding, and executeRecovery transfers to that recipient immediately. The two-step pattern prevents front-running but not operator discretion, and there is no timelock or on-chain consent from the owner or beneficiary. A compromised or malicious operator can route recovery funds to an attacker within the recovery window, which contradicts the documented trust model that the operator cannot redirect funds.
Acknowledged
#2 medium Issue
Emergency withdrawal can drain arbitrary funds to any address
When the contract is paused, emergencyWithdraw transfers any amount of any token to any recipient with no reference to the per-owner holdings ledger. Because the operator also controls pause, a single operator key can pause and then drain the entire custodial balance, including other owners' unrelated holdings, to an arbitrary address with no timelock and no per-holding cap. This is a total loss of custodial funds on operator key compromise and contradicts the stated trust model.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Emergency withdrawal emits no event
The emergencyWithdraw function moves tokens out of the contract but emits no event, while every other fund-moving path does. This contradicts the stated design that all fund movements are observable and makes the most powerful operator action the hardest to monitor. It compounds the emergency withdrawal access issue raised separately.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Operator handover is silent
The transferOperator function changes the operator address, which controls recovery approval, treasury sweeps and the emergency withdrawal, but emits no event. A change to such a powerful role should be logged for monitoring and transparency.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 optimization Issue
Revert strings instead of custom errors
The contract uses require statements with string messages throughout. Custom errors are cheaper to deploy and to revert with on this compiler version.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Timestamp dependence (accepted)
The recovery window checks compare block.timestamp against a ninety day deadline. Validators can move the timestamp by a small amount, but because the window is measured in days this has no practical effect.