Team and KYC Verification
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The DSNOKVault contract implements a proof-of-life state machine for the D-SNOK estate-continuity system, tracking each owner's renewal deadline and grace period and exposing an operator-only inactivity trigger. The overall design follows common, well-established patterns on Ethereum.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been assigned to a single operator address, currently the deployer wallet rather than the intended multi-sig. The owner retains full privileges including:
- Triggering inactivity for any vault once its deadline and grace period have elapsed.
- Pausing and unpausing all vault operations.
- Transferring the operator role through a two-step handover.
- The operator cannot set or change a vault's grace period or renewal interval; only the vault owner can, and only within the fixed minimum and maximum bounds enforced by the contract.
- The operator cannot trigger a vault before its deadline plus grace has passed.
- The operator cannot renew a vault on behalf of an owner; only the owner can prove life.
- The operator cannot redirect funds; the vault holds no tokens and is a pure state machine.
- The operator cannot change the fixed interval and grace bounds enforced by the contract.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- A two-step operator transfer that prevents handing control to an unconfirmed address.
- A seven day edit lock that blocks coerced last-minute configuration changes.
- A time-gated trigger that cannot fire before the deadline and grace period have fully elapsed.
- A pausable design for emergency situations that halts owner renewal and operator triggering symmetrically.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the DSNOKVault smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the D-SNOK team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Pause blocks owner renewal but not operator trigger
The renew function carries the whenNotPaused guard but triggerInactivity does not. While the contract is paused, an owner cannot perform proof-of-life and cannot use the documented emergency re-sign during the grace period, yet the operator can still trigger the vault once the deadline and grace have passed. A pause is an operator-only action, so this removes the owner's only on-chain defence while leaving the trigger available.
low Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Operator handover and grace-period changes are silent
Several state-changing functions in the vault update storage without emitting an event. transferOperator and acceptOperator change who controls the trigger and pause powers, and updateGracePeriod changes the inactivity timing, yet none of them log anything. Since the platform relies on off-chain monitoring, these silent changes are hard to detect.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Dead active flag and unused interface events
The VaultConfig.active flag is set to true at creation and there is no function that ever sets it back to false, so every active check is permanently true and effectively dead. The interface also declares GracePeriodStarted, VaultPaused and VaultUnpaused events that are never emitted, which can mislead integrators who watch for them.
Resolved
#3 low Issue
Shortening the interval can place the deadline in the past
updateRenewalInterval recomputes the deadline as lastRenewal plus the new interval. If the owner shortens the interval, the new deadline can already be in the past, which makes the vault immediately past due once the seven day edit lock expires, without the owner ever missing a real proof-of-life.
optimization Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 optimization Issue
VaultConfig struct packs poorly
The VaultConfig struct interleaves two boolean fields between several uint256 fields, which prevents tight storage packing and uses more slots than necessary. Reordering the fields and using narrower timestamp types would lower the storage footprint and the gas cost of writing a vault.
Resolved
#2 optimization Issue
Revert strings instead of custom errors
The contract uses require statements with long string messages throughout. Custom errors are cheaper to deploy and to revert with, and are the current best practice on this compiler version.
informational Issues | 5 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Unused Ownable import
The vault imports the OpenZeppelin Ownable contract but never inherits from it or uses it. Access control is handled by a custom operator address with a two-step transfer. The unused import is dead code and can confuse readers about how ownership works.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Timestamp dependence (accepted)
Time comparisons use block.timestamp for deadlines and grace periods. Validators can nudge the timestamp by a small amount, but since the intervals are measured in days this has no practical effect on the trigger logic.
Resolved
#3 informational Issue
Unnecessary reentrancy guard
The renew and triggerInactivity functions are marked nonReentrant but contain no external calls. The reentrancy guard therefore cannot be reached through any external interaction and only adds storage read and write overhead.
Resolved
#4 informational Issue
Grace period of zero is allowed despite a documented one-day minimum
createVault and updateGracePeriod only check that the grace period does not exceed the maximum, so a value of zero is accepted. The architecture document states a one-day minimum grace period, so the code and the specification disagree. A zero grace period means a vault becomes triggerable the instant the deadline passes, with no buffer for a late renewal.
Pending
#5 informational Issue
Floating pragma and unpinned EVM version
The source uses a floating pragma and the build configuration does not pin an EVM version. The deployed vault was compiled for the paris target, but an unpinned configuration can produce PUSH0 on newer targets, which is not supported on TRON and some other chains the project targets. This threatens cross-chain bytecode parity.