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Dreamster Info

dreamster.io

Dreamster isn't your average music app. We're passionate music lovers building a revolutionary way to experience the music you adore. Think of it as the future of music.

Dreamster Logo
Onboarded date 21/01/2025

Team and KYC Verification

The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.

In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

96.00
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0x5Bc6...9D27
Network
Ethereum - Sepolia Testnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/08/26
Revision date 2025/08/26

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is upgradeable

The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
  • The owner can set the signer's address.
  • The owner can update the swap address.
  • The owner can update the Uniswap router address.
  • The owner can set any arbitrary value in the liquidity pool amount.
  • The owner can withdraw ETH from the contract.
  • The owner can recover the tokens from the contract.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Dreamster smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Dreamster team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
of code

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Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

Critical
High
Medium
Low
Optimization
1
Informational
medium Issues | 3 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Silent Token Swap Failure Can Lead to Permanent Loss of Revenue
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
L382-470
Description

The contract contains a critical vulnerability within the _swapETHForTokensAndSendToSwap function, which is executed as part of the revenue distribution during an NFT purchase. This function uses a try/catch block to handle potential failures when swapping ETH for the dreamsterToken on Uniswap. If the swap fails for any reason (e.g., insufficient liquidity, high slippage), the catch block only emits an event and allows the parent buy transaction to continue and succeed. The ETH that was allocated for the swap (swapAmount) remains in the contract as WETH, with no mechanism for it to be recovered, refunded, or retried. This results in a silent failure of a core economic mechanism, causing a portion of the revenue from the sale to be permanently locked and lost within the contract.

Comments

To mitigate this vulnerability, the error handling within the catch block must be modified to ensure the atomicity of the buy operation. Instead of just emitting an event, the catch block should trigger a full reversion of the transaction, for example by calling revert SwapFailed(). This ensures that an unsuccessful token swap causes the entire purchase transaction to fail and roll back.

Resolved

#2 medium Issue
Price Protection Logic Flaw Can Unfairly Block Sellers and Trap Liquidity
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
L485-545
Description

A logic flaw exists in the sell function's price protection mechanism that can lead to paradoxical and unfair outcomes, including preventing users from selling their NFTs even when they would be draining the entire available liquidity pool. The issue stems from a mismatch in how the payout amount and the minimum acceptable price are determined. The contract calculates the minAcceptablePrice (95% of the value) based on the theoretical price the user should receive from the bonding curve (quotedResult.totalPrice). However, it then compares this threshold against the actual amount of ETH to be sent (ethToSend), which may have been capped by the liquidityPool's available balance. This creates scenarios where the contract blocks a sale for failing price protection simply because its own liquidity is insufficient to meet the original theoretical quote. For example, if the liquidityPool has 10 ETH, and a user sells NFTs theoretically worth 12 ETH, ethToSend is capped at 10 ETH. The minAcceptablePrice is calculated from the original quote (12 ETH * 0.95 = 11.4 ETH). The check if (10 ETH < 11.4 ETH) then causes the transaction to revert, unfairly punishing the seller for the contract's low liquidity and trapping the remaining funds.

Comments

To resolve this flaw, the price protection logic must be fundamentally changed to reflect the user's actual intent rather than relying on a fixed, internal rule that conflicts with the liquidity-capping mechanism. The most robust mitigation is to replace the hardcoded 95% slippage rule with a user-defined parameter, minEthToReceive, which would be added to the sell function's signature. The internal check would be simplified to if (ethToSend < minEthToReceive) revert PriceProtectionFailed;.

Resolved

#3 medium Issue
Owner Can Unilaterally Drain Liquidity, Rendering NFTs Permanently Unsustainable
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
L756-761
L773-790
Description

The withdrawETH function introduces a severe centralization risk by granting the owner the unilateral and immediate power to drain the entire liquidityPool. The liquidity pool, funded by a portion of every NFT purchase, is the fundamental guarantee of the NFTs' value and is the sole source of funds for paying users who wish to sell. This function allows the owner to treat the protocol's liquidity as their personal funds, creating a direct "rug pull" vector. A malicious or compromised owner could call this function to remove all the ETH that backs the value of the outstanding NFTs. This would instantly set the liquidityPool balance to zero, causing all subsequent sell transactions to fail permanently. This action would destroy the market's liquidity, render all NFTs unsellable, and effectively reduce their value within the ecosystem to zero, breaking the core trust and economic promise of the bonding curve.

Comments

To establish a trustless and autonomous market, the owner's privileged access to the liquidity pool must be removed or significantly restricted. The most secure mitigation is to remove the withdrawETH function entirely, architecturally committing the liquidity pool to be the permanent counterparty for sellers. A less drastic but still effective alternative is to implement a mandatory timelock system. With a timelock, the owner would have to publicly signal their intent to withdraw, which would trigger a non-negotiable waiting period (e.g., 2-7 days) before the funds could actually be moved.

low Issues | 3 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
L252-255
L 264-267
L272-274
L283-286
L296-305
Description

It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.

Resolved

#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
L272-274
Description

It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.

Resolved

#3 low Issue
"Testing-Only" Function Exposes Contract to Centralization Risks
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
L742-745
Description

The setLiquidityPool function, while explicitly noted in comments as being for testing purposes, introduces a critical centralization risk into the live contract. The presence of such a powerful and unguarded function in a production environment, regardless of its intended purpose, creates a single point of failure. If the owner's private key were ever compromised, an attacker could use this function to maliciously set the liquidityPool value to a number that does not match the contract's actual ETH balance. This would permanently break the sell functionality for all users, creating a denial-of-service condition and trapping all remaining liquidity. Furthermore, it opens the door to human error, where the owner could accidentally call this function on the mainnet contract, causing the same catastrophic failure.

Comments

Best practices for smart contract security dictate that code deployed to a live network should be stripped of all testing-only functionalities. The ability to manipulate state for testing should be handled externally through dedicated testing frameworks (like Hardhat or Foundry) that allow for mocking contracts or directly manipulating storage slots in a local, controlled environment. The setLiquidityPool function should be removed entirely from the production version of this contract. To manage initial liquidity, a safer, purpose-built addLiquidity function should be used, as it would ensure the contract's internal accounting always matches its real ETH balance.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Pending

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
DreamsterBondingCurveV2.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.