Dravix Info

Dravix is a new layer of security and intelligence for the blockchain world. With an adaptive and predictive AI-based approach.

Dravix Logo

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

35.95
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0x061c...9B63
Network
Ethereum - Mainnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/07/23
Revision date 2025/07/23

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can remove the max transaction and max wallet limit from the contract.
  • The owner can enable trading only once.
  • The taxwallet can manually swap tokens.

The contract employs a dynamic tax mechanism to manage initial trading. At launch, it imposes a high tax of 20% on all buy orders and 25% on sell orders. This initial high rate is designed to discourage early volatility and automated bots. Once the contract registers 20 buy transactions, it automatically enters a new phase, permanently reducing the tax for all future trades to a standard 5% for both buys and sells. Also, trading isn't enabled for this contract currently.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Dravix smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Dravix team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

/

State variables
public

/

Total lines
of code

/

Capabilities
Hover on items

/

Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 medium Issue
Liquidity is added to externally owned address.
Dravix.sol
L305
Description

The contract's liquidity is automatically added to the 'owner' address, which is not recommended because, in an extreme scenario, this can be used to drain liquidity from the contract.

Pending

#2 medium Issue
Unsafe Use of tx.origin for Cooldown Mechanism
Dravix.sol
L232
L236
Description

The smart contract's transfer delay mechanism was built using tx.origin, creating a critical vulnerability to "griefing" or denial-of-service attacks. This flaw can be actively exploited in a real-world scenario where an attacker tricks a user into interacting with a malicious contract (e.g., through a deceptive NFT airdrop). When the user calls the attacker's contract, it can in turn make an internal call to the Dravix contract. Because tx.origin points to the user's address, the malicious contract can trigger the one-purchase-per-block cooldown for the user. Consequently, if the user then attempts to make a legitimate purchase through a platform like Uniswap in the same block, their transaction will be rejected.

low Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 low Issue
Remove safemath library
Dravix.sol
L35-71
Description

The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.

Pending

#2 low Issue
Local variables shadowing (shadowing-local)
Dravix.sol
L200
L214-219
Description

Rename the local variables that shadow another component.