DEOS-X Info

DEOSX is a Digital Economy Operating System: secure, borderless financial products for corporates and institutions, built on programmable rails.

DEOS-X Logo

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

76.63
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2026/10/27
Revision date 2026/10/27

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Smart Contract Analysis Statement

Contract Analysis

The DEOS-X Yield Tranche contract implements a non-transferable receipt token that keeps the ERC20 interface but not its transfer and approval behaviour. The DEOS-X vault creates one such token for each of its three tranches when it is deployed, mints it one to one against the USDT capital an investor places in that tranche and burns it when that capital is paid back, so an investor's balance always equals the capital the vault holds for them in the tranche. The token is a short contract built on a widely used and well established token library. It uses the decimals of the vault's stablecoin, which are eighteen on BNB Smart Chain and six on Ethereum. Only the vault that created it can create or destroy tokens, approvals always revert and no token can ever move from one wallet to another, so the token records ownership of a fund position rather than being a tradable asset. There is no owner, no administrator, no pause switch, no blacklist, no transfer fee, no proxy and no external call anywhere in the code. The three tokens of the live pilot vault on BNB Smart Chain were confirmed to run exactly the reviewed code, although their source has not yet been published on the block explorer. The review found no critical, high, medium or low severity issues. It was proven with symbolic analysis that any call from any address other than the vault leaves an investor's balance, the total supply and the allowance granted to that caller unchanged, and the token's behaviour was exercised in every randomised test of the vault without a single deviation.

Ownership Privileges

The token has no owner and no administrator. The only privileged address is the vault that created it, which is fixed at creation and can never change, and the picture is as follows:

  • The vault mints tokens to an investor only as part of a deposit, in exactly the amount of USDT capital placed in the tranche.
  • The vault burns an investor's tokens only when the vault owner pays that investor's withdrawal request, in exactly the amount of capital paid back.
  • Nobody, including the vault, the vault owner and the holders themselves, can transfer tokens between wallets, approve a spender, freeze a balance or change the token name, symbol or decimals.
  • No party can upgrade, replace or shut down the token, because it is not a proxy, contains no code replacement mechanism and cannot be destroyed.
  • Because the tokens cannot be sold or transferred, a holder can only exit through a withdrawal request in the vault, and the timing of that exit is decided by the vault owner.

Security Features

The contract implements several positive security features:

  • The transfer restriction is enforced in the single internal hook through which every balance change passes, so it covers direct transfers and transfers on behalf of others alike, and only minting and burning can change a balance.
  • Approvals are refused outright, so no allowance can ever be created and no spender can ever act on a holder's tokens.
  • The minting and burning functions check the caller against an address fixed at creation, and there is no setup call that an outsider could race to claim the minting right.
  • The contract makes no external call and contains no inline machine code and no loops, and the few additions and subtractions without overflow checks in the underlying library are each guarded by a preceding balance or supply check, which removes reentrancy, overflow and gas exhaustion problems by construction.
  • The token uses the established library's standard balance accounting and events, so wallets and explorers display holdings and the minting and burning history correctly.

Points Requiring Attention

The following matters fall outside the code itself and deserve attention:

  • The token keeps the ERC20 function names but refuses approvals and transfers, including transfers of zero. Wallets, portfolio tools and token screening services may show a send function that always fails or flag the token as faulty, so the project should state clearly that the token cannot be transferred and ask explorers to label it accordingly.
  • The tokens of the live pilot carry the same names and symbols as the production tranches and are not yet verified on the block explorer. Holders should confirm a token by checking that its vault address is the published vault, and the team should verify the pilot tokens and give future pilot tokens distinct names.
  • The token has no market and no value of its own. What a holder receives depends entirely on the vault and on its owner paying withdrawal requests, as described in the separate statement for the vault.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the DEOS-X Yield Tranche (TrancheToken) smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the fund's investment strategy or terms. Moreover, we only audited the LP token contract for the DEOS-X team, and the vault that creates and controls it is covered by a separate statement. Other contracts and systems associated with the project were not audited by our team, including the owner Safe, the investor portal and its backend, the deployment scripts and the testnet helper contracts. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Findings and Audit result

informational Issues | 4 findings

Pending

#1 informational Issue
The LP token has the ERC-20 interface but deliberately refuses transfers and approvals
TrancheToken.sol
L43-52
Description

TrancheToken keeps the ERC-20 function signatures so wallets and explorers can show balances, but it is shaped like an ERC-20 token rather than compliant with the standard: approve always reverts, every transfer between two non-zero addresses reverts, including a transfer of zero, and transferFrom reverts for the same reason. No Approval event is ever emitted. This is intended, because LP must stay with the investor who deposited, and the code documents it. Software that treats any contract with these functions as an ordinary token will still misbehave: wallets offer a send action that always fails, portfolio and token-screening services that probe a zero transfer or an approval may classify the token as broken or as a honeypot, and a protocol that accepts arbitrary tokens as collateral could list it and then be unable to move it.

Pending

#2 informational Issue
The live pilot's LP tokens are unverified and carry the same names as the production tranches
TrancheToken.sol
L17-20
Description

The three LP tokens of the BSC pilot vault, at 0xC2b73270Ab4efac4E60f6D58664C830051112d09, 0x59aECFd5583d1aba4eBdD91f38A9DbF25D3c42Ed and 0x346dc3Eb0DB9FDC3732D1e0F42a5f03BfeDb02c4, run exactly the audited code, which was confirmed by comparing their deployed bytecode with a local build, but their source is not verified on the explorer. They are named DEOS-X Yield Tranche 1 to 3 with the symbols dxT1 to dxT3, the names the production fund will use as well, because the vault hard-codes them for every deployment. Names and symbols can be copied by anyone, so the only reliable way to recognise a genuine LP token is its vault address checked against the vault's own record of its tokens, and an unverified contract makes that check harder for holders. Pilot LP therefore cannot be told apart from fund LP by name, which makes look-alike token scams easier.

Pending

#3 informational Issue
mint, burn, decimals and vault have no NatSpec
TrancheToken.sol
L11
L27-37
Description

The contract-level comment explains what the token is for, but the vault address, the decimals override and the two vault-only functions that create and destroy LP carry no comments. These are the parts an integrator or reviewer reads first to understand who can change balances and what a unit of LP means. The vault contract has similar gaps, reported separately for it.

Pending

#4 informational Issue
The pinned compiler release has known defects that later releases fix, none of which affects this code
TrancheToken.sol
L2
Description

The token is pinned to solc 0.8.30. The official bug list records eight defects present in that release and fixed between 0.8.32 and 0.8.38. Each was checked against this code and none is reachable: the build uses the legacy pipeline, and the token declares no transient state, no custom storage layout, no recursion and no inline assembly of its own, and the library code it inherits does not contain the patterns the defects need. The deployed pilot tokens are therefore not affected. The same compiler setting applies to the vault contract and is reported separately for it.