TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

35.95
Poor Excellent

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Security Assessments

"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0x8002...8272
Network
Ethereum - Mainnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/02/17
Revision date 2025/02/17

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Token transfer can be locked

Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can pause the debit and credit functionality in the contract.
  • The owner can toggle the mint burn model.
  • The owner can update the sendEnabled mapping to allow or block sending tokens to a destination chain identified by _dstEid.
  • The owner can update the receiveEnabled mapping to permit or prevent receiving tokens from a source chain identified by _srcEid.
  • The owner can unlock the tokens locked in the contract.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the De.Fi smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the De.Fi team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

/

State variables
public

/

Total lines
of code

/

Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
DeFiOFTAdapter.sol
L99-114
L116-129
Description

In both the _debit and _credit functions, reentrancy risks arise from external token calls—_debit calls either burnFrom or safeTransferFrom, and _credit calls mint or safeTransfer. If these token contracts implement callbacks (e.g., ERC777 tokens) or are maliciously coded, they might trigger reentrant calls. Although both functions perform all state validations before these external calls and don’t alter state afterward, this pattern can still be vulnerable if not protected. To mitigate this risk, it is advisable to apply reentrancy guards (such as nonReentrant modifiers) on the public functions that invoke these internal functions, ensuring that no unintended reentrant execution occurs.

Pending

#2 medium Issue
The owner can pause functionality.
DeFiOFTAdapter.sol
L62-64
Description

The pausing functionality in this contract is controlled solely by the owner, creating a centralization risk. When the contract is paused, both the _debit and _credit functions are disabled, meaning cross-chain token transfers cannot occur. This gives the owner unilateral power to halt operations, which can lead to censorship or disruption of service if the owner misuses their control or if their keys are compromised. In decentralized systems, such a single point of control undermines trust and can prevent users from freely transferring assets. Mitigation measures might include decentralized governance, multi-signature controls, or timelocks to ensure that pausing is exercised only under well-defined and secure circumstances.

low Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
DeFiOFTAdapter.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

Pending

#2 low Issue
Missing emit.
DeFiOFTAdapter.sol
L87-97
Description

Emit all the critical parameter changes.