Deep Snitch Info
DeepSnitch AI is a next-gen, AI-driven suite of blockchain surveillance tools. Our proprietary AI agents monitor on-chain transactions, social channels, and private groups to deliver real-time, actionable intelligence on whales, influencers, and hidden deals. Powered by the $DSNT token, DeepSnitch unlocks exclusive access, premium alerts, and high-yield staking—enabling traders to act before the crowd and profit off the attention economy.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
Staking.sol
- The owner can change the verifier address.
- The owner can change the claiming start time.
- The owner can deposit rewards into the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Deep Snitch smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Deep Snitch team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The Staking.sol contract has re-entrancy vulnerabilities because multiple functions fail to follow the Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) security pattern. Functions like stake, stakePermit, stakeSponsored, and depositRewards all execute an external token transfer before updating the contract's internal state. This allows a malicious token to make a re-entrant call, forcing the contract to operate on stale data, which can lead to incorrect reward calculations. The most severe vulnerability is in the withdrawStake function. It sends tokens to the user before decreasing the totalStaked state variable. An attacker can re-enter the contract in this window, and because totalStaked is still high, their share of the reward pool is artificially inflated, allowing them to steal rewards from other users. All of these functions require re-entrancy guards and must be reordered to update state before making any external calls.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Owner Can change the claim reward period.
The setClaimingStartTimestamp function is marked external and onlyOwner, with no other restrictions on when it can be called. The constructor sets an initial, predictable claimingStartTimestamp that users will see when they decide to stake. However, the owner can call this function at any point later to override that value. A malicious owner could wait for a large amount of funds to be staked and then call this function to set the claimingStartTimestamp to a date far in the future (e.g., 100 years from now). Since both withdrawStake() and claimRewards() require block.timestamp >= claimingStartTimestamp, this action would effectively lock all users' staked tokens and rewards in the contract, preventing anyone but the owner from ever accessing them.