Crotch Info

Welcome to Crotch Token - where crypto meets comedy! Our mission? To make you smile, earn, and support charitable causes, all while holding a hilariously named token. Dive in, hold on, and enjoy the rewards, because with Crotch, we're raising funds... and a few eyebrows!

Crotch Logo

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

12.21
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0x39CF...4167
Network
Ethereum - Mainnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/01/21
Revision date 2025/01/21

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can toggle presale active settings.
  • The owner can update the signature address.
  • The owner can update the USDC token price.
  • The owner can withdraw funds from the contract.
  • The owner can withdraw the unsold crotch tokens from the contract.
  • The owner can update the owner's tax address.
  • The owner can update the presale start time and end time.
  • The owner can update the minimum and maximum purchase limits.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Crotch presale smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Crotch team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. Also, the presale will be launched on the private platform so it is recommended to do your own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

/

State variables
public

/

Total lines
of code

/

Capabilities
Hover on items

/

Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 5 findings

Pending

#1 medium Issue
Missing allowance check.
Presale.sol
L471-555
Description

In the function tokenPurchase(), users can buy tokens using USDC or CRO, which are ERC-20 tokens. The function calls transferFrom directly without first checking if the user has approved enough tokens. If the user has not given sufficient allowance, the transaction will fail, causing unnecessary gas wastage. To prevent unnecessary gas loss and improve UX, add an allowance check before calling transferFrom.

Pending

#2 medium Issue
Missing threshold for tokenPrice.
Presale.sol
L557-563
Description

The setTokenPrice function allows the owner to arbitrarily change the token price, creating a centralization risk. Without restrictions, the owner can inflate or decrease the price at will, leading to unfair purchases, price manipulation, or rug pulls. To mitigate this, price change limits (e.g., max ±10% per update) should be implemented. Alternatively, integrating a trusted oracle (e.g., Chainlink) ensures decentralized pricing. Another safeguard is requiring multi-signature approval or community governance before price updates. These measures prevent owner abuse, ensuring fairness and transparency in token purchases while maintaining buyer trust.

Pending

#3 medium Issue
The owner can withdraw tokens mid-sale.
Presale.sol
L566-582
L585-617
Description

The withdrawUnsoldTokens function allows the owner to withdraw unsold tokens at any time, even while the presale is still ongoing. This creates a centralization risk where the owner can manipulate token supply, potentially reducing available tokens and harming investors. Without restrictions, tokens could be withdrawn mid-sale, impacting buyer confidence. To mitigate this, a condition should be added to ensure withdrawals occur only after the presale ends. Implementing multi-signature approvals and transparent event logging can further prevent misuse. These measures enhance security and protect investors from potential manipulation by ensuring fair token distribution throughout the presale process.

Pending

#4 medium Issue
The owner can update the presale time mid-sale.
Presale.sol
L669-686
Description

Allowing the owner to update presale times mid-sale poses risks such as market manipulation, investor uncertainty, and potential exit scams. The owner could extend or shorten the presale based on market conditions, impacting early investors and creating mistrust. Abruptly ending the sale may prevent participation while still retaining control over funds. Additionally, preferential treatment for certain investors could lead to unfair token distribution. To mitigate these risks, updates should be restricted before the presale starts, require community approval, set change limits, and ensure transparency through event emissions, protecting investors from sudden and unfair changes.

Pending

#5 medium Issue
Missing check for purchase limit upgradation mid-sale.
Presale.sol
L688-702
Description

Allowing the owner to update purchase limits mid-sale introduces risks of unfair restrictions or preferential treatment. The owner could increase the minimum purchase amount, preventing small investors from participating, or lower the maximum limit, capping investments arbitrarily. This could manipulate demand, limit access for certain buyers, or enable insider advantages. Investors expecting stable conditions might be negatively impacted by sudden changes. To mitigate these risks, updates should only be allowed before the presale starts, require a time lock before activation, or be governed by a decentralized mechanism ensuring fair and transparent changes.

low Issues | 3 findings

Pending

#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Presale.sol
L14
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

Pending

#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
Presale.sol
L467-469
Description

It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.

Pending

#3 low Issue
Missing events
Presale.sol
L467-469
L585-617
L661-667
Description

Make sure to emit events for all the critical parameter changes in the contract to ensure the transparency and trackability of all the changes.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Pending

#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
Presale.sol
L31
L35
L262
L304
Description

It is recommended to remove unused code from the contract.