ConviMiles Info
Convicoin is a blockchain-based loyalty token that revolutionizes how you earn and use rewards. It connects merchants and customers through a secure, transparent, and efficient platform.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can withdraw the unclaimed tokens from the contract.
Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the locker contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the token’s logic. Furthermore, we only audited the mentioned contract associated with this project. Other contracts related to this project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors conduct their own research before engaging with the token.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Redundant Safety Cap in Time Calculation
The claim function includes a safety mechanism that caps the calculated months_elapsed at a value equivalent to the beneficiary's total vesting duration plus ten years. This is intended to prevent issues with extremely large time differences. However, the subsequent vesting logic already constrains the effective number of months used for calculation by the vesting_month variable (which is total_months - cliff_months). Because this subsequent step already imposes a strict and lower ceiling on the value used in the final token calculation, the initial safety cap is rendered redundant and does not influence the outcome of the function.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Use of Panicking Arithmetic for State Updates
The line data_account.beneficiaries[index].claimed_tokens += transfer_amount; uses the += operator to update the amount of tokens a beneficiary has claimed. In Rust, standard arithmetic operators (+, -, *, /, +=) will panic if they overflow or underflow. If a panic occurs in a Solana program, the entire transaction fails, and any state changes are reverted. Also, the code uses panicking arithmetic (+=). Specifically, total_unclaimed += unclaimed_tokens; could panic if the total sum of unclaimed tokens from all beneficiaries exceeds the maximum value of a u64. This would cause the entire transaction to fail. This is a real risk in high-value contracts or those with a large number of beneficiaries. The same applies to _beneficiaries_processed, although an overflow there is impossible given MAX_BENEFICIARIES is 50.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Precision Loss in Monthly Vesting Calculation
The core vesting formula in the claim function calculates a beneficiary's unlocked tokens using integer arithmetic. Specifically, the division operation (Total Allocation * Months Vested) / Total Vesting Months truncates any fractional remainder, meaning it discards any "partial" tokens that have accrued within an incomplete monthly period. This results in a "stepped" vesting schedule where tokens are released in discrete monthly chunks rather than vesting smoothly and continuously over time. For example, in a schedule vesting 100 tokens over 3 months, a beneficiary who is 59 days in (nearly 2 months) would still only be able to claim the tokens for the first month ((100 * 1) / 3 = 33 tokens), as the second month is not yet fully complete. The tokens for the second month only become available as a single chunk once the full 60-day period has passed. While no tokens are permanently lost, the timing of their availability can be counter-intuitive to beneficiaries expecting a more linear release.