Cointicket Info
CoinTicket is the first crypto trading signals platform where traders prove their track records and investors gain confidence through transparent performance. Cutting through hype and noise, CoinTicket delivers clarity, credibility, and proven alpha.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can end the presale.
- The owner can update the TGE timestamp.
- The owner can extend the end date for any presale phase.
- The owner can withdraw all USDT, USDC, and ETH funds from the contract.
- The owner can withdraw any remaining/unsold presale tokens.
- The owner can assign and distribute referral rewards.
- The owner can distribute airdrop tokens.
- The owner can pause and unpause the contract's purchasing functions.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the CoinTicket smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the CoinTicket team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
The owner can withdraw the vested tokens.
The withdrawRemainingTokens function allows the owner to withdraw an arbitrary number of tokens from the contract without verifying if those tokens are already promised to users. The contract's liabilities—including all purchased but unclaimed baseTokens and all tokens owed to users in vestedAmount schedules—are not checked. This allows a malicious or negligent owner to drain the contract of tokens that rightfully belong to the presale participants, effectively stealing their assets. Consequently, when users later attempt to call the claim() or releaseVested() functions, the transactions will fail due to an insufficient token balance, making it impossible for them to ever receive their purchased and vested tokens.
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Precision Loss in Purchase Calculation
The _buy function uses integer division to determine the number of tokens a user can purchase, which often results in rounding down and creates a small residual value, or "dust," in the remainingUsd variable. A strict check, require(remainingUsd == 0), at the end of the function then fails due to this dust, causing the entire transaction to revert. Crucially, the initial transfer of the user's funds occurs before this check and is not rolled back, leading to a scenario where the user's money is permanently locked in the contract while they receive no tokens in return.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Incorrect Bonus Tier Calculation due to Integer Division
The claim function determines a user's bonus tier by first converting their 18-decimal token balance into a whole number using the calculation uint256 fullBase = base / 10**18;. This operation truncates any fractional part of the user's holdings. Consequently, a user with a balance fractionally below a tier threshold (e.g., 499,999.99 tokens) will be incorrectly rounded down and placed in a lower bonus tier. This leads to them receiving a smaller bonus than they are entitled to based on their actual investment, causing a tangible financial loss.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.