Circle Layer Info
Circle Layer delivers full EVM compatibility with 2,000 TPS on testnet, targeting 50,000 TPS for mainnet, enhanced by AI-powered security features and ultra-low fees. Get in early before mainnet launch. Testnet achieving 2,000 TPS with 3-second blocks.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The deployer or owner can set the treasury1 and treasury2 wallets.
- The owner can enable trading only once.
- The owner can exclude wallets from fees.
- The owner can exclude wallets from the max wallet amount.
The contract contains the functionality in which the transaction fee starts at 30% and is gradually reduced to 5% during the first hour of trading to stabilize the launch. After this initial period, the fee is determined by the total funds raised, decreasing from 5% down to 0% as the project achieves key funding milestones.
The ownership of the contract is renounced. Hence, the owner cannot change any settings in the contract mentioned above.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Circle Layer smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Circle Layer team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing 'require' check
The contract is missing a crucial check to ensure the treasury wallets can receive ETH. When transferring funds, it uses a low-level .call but fails to verify the return value to confirm the transaction was successful. If a treasury address is a contract that cannot accept ETH payments (i.e., it lacks a receive() or payable fallback function), the transfer will fail silently. The ETH will not be sent to the treasury but will instead become permanently locked within the CircleLayer contract, as the transaction does not revert to signal the failure.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Transfer of tokens without enabling trade.
The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize addresses manually and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Unsafe Use of tx.origin for Anti-Bot Measures.
The contract uses tx.origin to enforce a limit on the number of buy transactions an account can perform within a single block (maxBuyTxsPerBlockPerOrigin). This mechanism is vulnerable to phishing attacks. If a user is tricked into calling a malicious contract, that contract can then interact with the CircleLayer token contract on the user's behalf. Because tx.origin refers to the original EOA that initiated the transaction (the user), the malicious contract can manipulate the transaction count associated with the victim's address. This could be used to intentionally exhaust the victim's per-block buy limit, preventing them from making legitimate purchases during the critical launch phase.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Redundant Function for Fee Exclusion
The contract currently includes two separate functions, setExcludedFromFees and setCexAddressExcludedFromFees, which serve the same fundamental purpose of exempting an address from transaction fees. The only distinction between them is their access control: one is restricted to the contract owner, while the other can be called by either the _deployer or the owner. This duplication of functionality introduces unnecessary complexity and code bloat to the contract. It makes the codebase harder to maintain and can cause confusion for developers or auditors trying to understand the intended access control policies for managing fee exemptions.