Cipera Info
CIPERA is a utility-driven ERC-20 token created to deliver real use cases within a scalable and secure blockchain ecosystem. It combines technology, transparency, and user participation to create a platform where value is not just traded — but created.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The CIPERA contract implements an ERC20 token with a fixed supply minted once at deployment, public burning, standard allowance handling, and a now-disabled owner-only recovery helper. While the overall design follows common patterns on Ethereum, a few areas need attention:
- Because ownership has been renounced, the owner-only recovery function can never be called again, so any ETH or token sent to the contract address from now on would be permanently locked.
- The recovery function sends ETH with a fixed, low gas amount and moves tokens with a plain transfer, which would not behave well for contract recipients or for tokens that do not return a boolean. This has no live impact since the function can no longer be called.
- The transferFrom function updates balances before it checks and reduces the spender allowance. This is not exploitable in the deployed code, but it deviates from the recommended order and would become risky if a future version introduced an external call in the transfer path.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been renounced - the owner is now the zero address, which permanently disables every owner-only function. Historically, while the contract still had an owner, that owner held the following privileges, all of which are now permanently disabled:
- Recover ETH or any ERC20 token that was mistakenly sent to the contract.
- Transfer ownership to another address.
- Renounce ownership, which has now been done on-chain.
- No further privileged actions existed beyond these.
- The owner could not mint new tokens - there is no mint function and the supply can only decrease through burning.
- The owner could not pause transfers or gate trading - there is no pause or trading switch.
- The owner could not blacklist, freeze, or otherwise restrict any individual account.
- The owner could not set or change fees - the token has no fee mechanism at all.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- A fixed supply that is minted exactly once at deployment, with no path to create new tokens afterwards, so the supply can only stay the same or decrease.
- Ownership has been renounced, which removes the centralization concerns that an active owner would otherwise carry.
- No fees, no blacklist, no pause, no anti-whale limits, and no trading gate, meaning the token does not exhibit common honeypot or rug patterns.
- Full ERC20 conformance, and a verified public source that exactly matches the deployed bytecode on Base.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the CIPERA smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the CIPERA team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Funds sent to the token contract cannot be recovered after ownership was renounced
The contract can receive ETH and exposes a recovery function that lets the owner sweep ETH or any ERC-20 that lands on the contract by mistake. That recovery function is restricted to the owner. Since ownership has been renounced and the owner is now the zero address, the recovery function can never be called again. As a result, any ETH or token sent to the contract from now on is permanently locked. There is nothing stuck today, but the trap remains for any future accidental transfer.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Owner could sweep assets held by the contract before ownership was renounced
While the contract still had an owner, that owner could move any ETH or ERC-20 balance held by the contract to itself and could also reassign ownership. The owner could not mint, pause, blacklist, change fees or freeze balances, because none of that logic exists. Since the token does not hold user funds during normal use, the real reach of this power was limited to assets accidentally sent to the contract. Ownership has since been renounced, so this exposure no longer exists on-chain.
optimization Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Deployment target address can be marked immutable
The target address is written once in the constructor and never changed afterwards. Keeping it as a regular storage variable spends gas on storage reads and writes that an immutable variable would avoid. Marking it immutable would save gas at deployment and on every read.
Pending
#2 optimization Issue
Revert strings could be replaced with custom errors
The contract reverts with long descriptive strings throughout. Each string adds to deployment size and to runtime cost when a revert happens. Custom errors, available since Solidity 0.8.4, convey the same information at a lower gas cost.
Pending
#3 optimization Issue
Large numeric literal and supply arithmetic can be tidied
The fixed supply is written as a full numeric value multiplied by ten to the eighteenth power. Scientific notation reads more clearly and is less error-prone. The internal supply increment and decrement use the default checked arithmetic, which is correct; only minor and optional gas savings would be possible by reworking them.
informational Issues | 8 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
transferFrom moves balances before checking the allowance
The transferFrom function performs the balance movement first and only afterwards reads, checks and reduces the spender allowance. This is the reverse of the recommended order. It is not exploitable here because the transfer path makes no external call, the arithmetic is checked, and the whole call reverts as one unit if the allowance is too small. The note stands because the ordering would become risky if a future version added a callback before the allowance is enforced.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Recovery function uses a fixed-gas ETH send and a plain token transfer
The recovery function sends ETH using a method that forwards only a small fixed amount of gas, which could fail if the recipient is a contract that needs more gas to accept funds. It also moves tokens with a plain transfer whose boolean result is checked, but tokens that do not return a boolean would cause the call to fail. Both observations have no live impact because the function is owner-only and ownership has been renounced.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Ownership transfer is single-step
Ownership is handed over in a single step, assigning the new owner immediately. A typo in the new owner address would transfer control to an account nobody controls, with no way to undo it. A two-step handover removes this risk. The practical relevance here is low because ownership is already renounced.
Pending
#4 informational Issue
Asset recovery emits no event
Recovering ETH or tokens moves value out of the contract but produces no event, which makes it harder to observe and audit off-chain. Ownership changes, by contrast, do emit an event. Adding an event to the recovery path would improve transparency.
Pending
#5 informational Issue
Standard ERC-20 approval race condition
Changing an existing non-zero allowance to another non-zero value can be front-run, allowing a spender to use both the old and the new allowance. This is the well-known ERC-20 approval race. The contract already provides helper functions to increase and decrease allowances, which avoid the issue when used.
Pending
#6 informational Issue
Parameter shadowing and non-standard variable naming
Two functions declare a parameter named owner, which shadows the contract function that returns the owner. Separately, two internal variables use a leading double underscore that does not match the conventional naming style. Neither issue changes how the contract behaves; both can confuse readers and reviewers.
Pending
#7 informational Issue
Dead and redundant code
The contract contains an internal helper that is never used, an empty transfer hook with no implementation, and a base decimals function that returns a hardcoded value which is always overridden by the decimals taken from the constructor. None of these affect runtime behavior, but they add noise and can mislead readers about how decimals are actually determined.
Pending
#8 informational Issue
Constructor does not explicitly validate the target address
The constructor stores the supplied target address without an explicit zero-address check. A deployment with a zero target is nevertheless impossible, because minting the initial supply to the zero address reverts and aborts the deployment. The missing explicit check is therefore covered in depth by the mint guard, but an explicit check would make the intent clearer.