Cheap GM Info
CheapGM is a fun, lightweight Web3 dApp where users say "GM" on-chain to earn XP, climb leaderboards, and get rewards. It’s simple, social, and powered by smart contracts with built-in referral payouts.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the duration of each round interval to not more than 7 days.
- The owner can set the fees to not more than 20%.
- The owner can change the round name.
- The owner can change the LoserNFT address.
- The owner can change the VRF configurations.
- The owner can withdraw the unlocked USDT tokens from the contract to the recipient address.
- The owner can refund the tokens of the user of a sealed round.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BronzeQuestUSDT smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Cheap GM team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Incorrect prize distribution calculation.
The prize calculation logic within the fulfillRandomWords function is critically flawed, leading to an incorrect and unfair distribution of the prize pool. While the function correctly calculates the prize for the first winner(s) based on their predefined percentages (e.g., 55% for Winner 1), it incorrectly handles the payout for the final winner in any round with fewer than four winners. The logic discards the intended percentage for the last winner and instead awards them the entire remaining balance of the prize pool. For instance, in a three-winner scenario, the third winner receives the remainder after the first two are paid (25% of the pool) instead of their designated 15%.
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Unsafe Entry Fee Update Mechanism Lacks Safeguards
The setEntryFee function poses two distinct risks to players due to insufficient validation and unsafe timing. Firstly, the function lacks an upper-bound check, allowing the owner to set an arbitrarily high entry fee, which could halt the game and trap funds by making it impossible for new players to join. Secondly, the fee can be changed at any time, even in the middle of an active round. This creates an unfair environment where participants in the same round could pay different entry fees, leading to an inconsistent prize pool and a confusing user experience. A user could have their join transaction fail if the owner front-runs them and increases the fee after they've approved the initial amount.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Game Rules Can Be Changed Mid-Round via setMinPlayers
The setMinPlayers function allows the contract owner to instantly modify the minimum number of players required to finalize a round. This change can be executed while a round is active, fundamentally altering the "win condition" after players have already committed their funds. A malicious or careless owner could lower the threshold, causing a round to finalize prematurely with a smaller prize pool than participants expected and potentially causing the next joining player's transaction to fail. Conversely, an owner could raise the minimum player count, unfairly forcing a round that had already met its goal into a rollover, which could be used to indefinitely trap player funds.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 optimization Issue
Unpredictable Gas Costs for Users Due to Bundled Housekeeping Logic
The join() function contains a call to the internal _autoProcess() function, which bundles core system maintenance with the user's action of joining a round. If a user's transaction is the first to execute after a previous round has expired, they are forced to bear the entire gas cost of processing that old round, which can include gas-intensive operations like looping through players and performing multiple token transfers during a rollover. This leads to a highly unpredictable and potentially exorbitant gas fee for the joining player, creating a poor user experience, risking transaction failures due to insufficient gas, and violating the principle of least surprise as users do not expect to pay for system upkeep.