CebuCore Info
CebuCore (CCORE) is the native utility token powering a real-world development program focused on Cebu Island and the surrounding region. The project deploys Smart Development Zones (SDZ) — integrated clusters across energy, transport, logistics, hospitality, and municipal services — and connects them to a Web3 layer for payments, rewards, and advisory governance. CCORE enables payments, gated access, loyalty incentives, and community-driven advisory governance. Security foundations include independent audits, multisig treasury, and long-term locks.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- There are no ownership privileges in this contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the VESTING_ECOSYSTEM smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Cebucore team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Owner Can Arbitrarily Pause Vesting Schedules
The CCRMultiVesting contract, which is used for team, advisor, ecosystem, and private sale vesting, contains a function named toggleSchedule. This function is designated as onlyOwner, granting the contract owner the unilateral ability to pause and unpause any vesting schedule for any beneficiary at any time. A malicious or compromised owner can exploit this by setting a schedule's active status to false, which effectively halts all token claims for that beneficiary. Because the owner can do this without warning or a time delay, it introduces a significant centralization risk and undermines the core promise of a trustless vesting contract. The beneficiary's funds can be locked indefinitely at the sole discretion of the owner.
low Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Missing Logical Time Validation in Vesting Schedule Creation
The addSchedule function in the CCRMultiVesting contract validates that the beneficiary is not the zero address and that total and duration are greater than zero. However, it fails to perform critical logical validation on the time-related parameters of the vesting schedule (start, cliff, duration). This omission makes it possible for the owner to create schedules with nonsensical or impossible parameters, such as a cliff that occurs before the start of the vesting period, or a duration that is so short the cliff happens after the schedule has already officially ended. Such schedules would not behave as expected and could lead to confusion or prevent beneficiaries from claiming their tokens correctly.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Natspec Comments Not in English
The Natspec documentation and some inline comments in the contract are written in Russian. While this does not affect the contract's execution, it creates a significant barrier to transparency and auditability for a global audience. The blockchain ecosystem is international, and English is the lingua franca. Comments that are not in English prevent a large portion of developers, auditors, and community members from understanding the intended purpose and logic of the contract, which can erode trust.