CebuCore Info
CebuCore (CCORE) is the native utility token powering a real-world development program focused on Cebu Island and the surrounding region. The project deploys Smart Development Zones (SDZ) — integrated clusters across energy, transport, logistics, hospitality, and municipal services — and connects them to a Web3 layer for payments, rewards, and advisory governance. CCORE enables payments, gated access, loyalty incentives, and community-driven advisory governance. Security foundations include independent audits, multisig treasury, and long-term locks.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- There are no ownership privileges in the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Token smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Cebucore team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
The owner can lock the token transfer.
The CebuCoreToken contract inherits from OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract and includes a public pause() function restricted to the owner. This function acts as an emergency stop or "kill switch" for the entire token's transfer functionality. When the owner calls pause(), the whenNotPaused modifier on the _update function will cause all token transfers—including transfer, approve, and transferFrom—to revert. While this is a common feature intended for use in emergencies, such as the discovery of a critical vulnerability in an integrated protocol, it represents a significant centralization of power. A malicious or compromised owner could use this function to freeze the assets of all token holders indefinitely, making the token untradeable and unusable across the entire ecosystem.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Owner Can Effectively Halt Trading by Setting Maliciously Restrictive Limits
The setLimits function allows the owner to change the anti-bot maxTx and maxWallet limits at any time after trading has been enabled. Crucially, this function is missing input validation to ensure the limits are reasonable. A malicious or compromised owner could call this function and set the maxTxAmount to a near-zero value, such as 1 wei. According to the logic in the _update function, all subsequent transfers from non-exempted wallets would then be subjected to require(value <= 1, ...). This would cause any meaningful transaction to fail, effectively halting all trading and transfers for regular users. This provides the owner with a "soft lock" on the token, a significant centralization risk that can be exploited without calling the more obvious pause function.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.