CebuCore Info
CebuCore (CCORE) is the native utility token powering a real-world development program focused on Cebu Island and the surrounding region. The project deploys Smart Development Zones (SDZ) — integrated clusters across energy, transport, logistics, hospitality, and municipal services — and connects them to a Web3 layer for payments, rewards, and advisory governance. CCORE enables payments, gated access, loyalty incentives, and community-driven advisory governance. Security foundations include independent audits, multisig treasury, and long-term locks.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The SEEDER can seed the allocations.
- The SEEDER can permanently disable the seed allocations.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the CCRClaimDistributor smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Cebucore team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 4 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Owner Can Arbitrarily Overwrite and Reduce User Allocations.
The setAllocations function allows the contract owner to unilaterally change any user's totalAllocation at any time. This function overwrites existing values, meaning a user's promised allocation is not guaranteed on-chain. A malicious or compromised owner could exploit this by reducing a user's allocation just before they claim, effectively negating the purpose of a trustless vesting contract.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Owner Can Indefinitely Pause All Claiming Activity
The SimpleAllowanceDistributorV7 contract inherits from OpenZeppelin's Pausable utility and exposes a public pause() function restricted to the owner. The primary claim() function is decorated with the whenNotPaused modifier. This combination grants the owner the unilateral power to halt all claiming activity for every beneficiary at any time. By calling pause(), the owner can effectively freeze the contract, causing all subsequent calls to claim() to revert. This "kill switch" functionality can be activated without warning and for an indefinite period, representing a significant centralization risk that undermines the on-chain guarantee of the vesting schedule.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Missing Input Validation on Vesting Schedule Configuration
The setTge and setIntervalSeconds functions in the ClaimDistributor contract allow the owner to configure the vesting timeline. However, both functions lack any input validation. The setTge function allows the owner to set a tgeTimestamp that is in the past, and the setIntervalSeconds function allows the owner to set the interval to zero. While setting a past TGE is not a direct vulnerability, setting the interval to zero can lead to unexpected behavior in the vesting calculation. Specifically, if intervalSeconds is zero, the unlockedBpsAt function will revert due to a division-by-zero error if called with a timestamp after the TGE. This would effectively halt all vesting progress calculation after the initial TGE unlock, preventing users from claiming their subsequent tranches.
Pending
#4 medium Issue
Risk of Permanent Token Loss Due to Lack of Withdrawal Function
The CCRClaimDistributor smart contract is vulnerable to an irreversible loss of funds due to the absence of any function to withdraw or rescue excess tokens. The contract is designed to only disburse tokens via the claim function, which is strictly tied to the vesting schedule of seeded users. If the amount of tokens transferred to the contract exceeds the totalAllocated amount for all users, whether by accident, typo, or miscalculation, the surplus tokens will be permanently trapped within the contract address. There is no administrative capability for anyone, including the original SEEDER, to recover these excess assets once they are sent.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Natspec Comments Not in English
The Natspec documentation and some inline comments in the contract are written in Russian. While this does not affect the contract's execution, it creates a significant barrier to transparency and auditability for a global audience. The blockchain ecosystem is international, and English is the lingua franca. Comments that are not in English prevent a large portion of developers, auditors, and community members from understanding the intended purpose and logic of the contract, which can erode trust.