TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The ReferralClaimer contract implements a UUPS-upgradeable referral-rebate distributor that is pre-funded by the team and pays out USD-denominated amounts against a per-code cumulative ledger. Every claim must carry a fresh EIP-712 signature whose signer holds VALIDATOR_ROLE, which makes the contract materially safer than a one-key-drains-all design. While the overall pattern is solid, a few areas need attention:
- setReferralRegister immediately replaces the registry pointer used to resolve the rebate recipient, with no event, no two-step, and no timelock. A compromised or malicious admin call can therefore silently re-route every subsequent claim to attacker-chosen addresses.
- claim resolves the recipient at execute time rather than at sign time. If a code holder transfers the recipient slot in ReferralRegister.updateRecipient between signing and execution, the funds go to the new recipient. This is intended behaviour but it has subtle consequences for replay infrastructure that batches signatures, and it should be either documented as an invariant or constrained by including the recipient in the EIP-712 struct.
- Distribution rounds down silently for the same reason as in Payout. The per-code ledger is set to the full accumulatedAmountUsd while the actually-transferred amount is truncated when the cumulative is not aligned to the smallest supported token's scale. The dust is silently retained by the contract and is unrecoverable on subsequent claims.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been organised through OpenZeppelin's AccessControlEnumerable. DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, UPGRADER_ROLE and VALIDATOR_ROLE are granted to the deployer-supplied admin at initialize time. The owner retains full privileges including:
- Adding or removing supported tokens.
- Pausing and unpausing the contract.
- Replacing the ReferralRegister pointer through setReferralRegister, which determines who collects every future rebate.
- Withdrawing the contract's funds to any address through withdrawTo.
- The admin cannot mint or create tokens; rebates only come from the contract's pre-funded balance.
- The admin cannot forge a claim; the EIP-712 signature is the second factor.
- The admin cannot bypass pause for claim.
- The admin cannot replay a previously-used signature; cumulative monotonicity blocks duplicate submissions.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- EIP-712 signed claims with chain-id-bound domain separator, expiry enforcement, and recovery through OpenZeppelin's ECDSA helper.
- Cumulative tracking by referral code that doubles as replay protection without requiring an explicit nonce.
- nonReentrant on claim plus Pausable on the entire claim path for incident response.
- Implementation contract calls _disableInitializers in the constructor, blocking proxy front-running on initialize.
Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the ReferralClaimer smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Other contracts associated with the project (EvaluationVault, Payout, ReferralRegister) are covered in separate reports. We recommend investors do their own research before integrating with the contract.
Files and details
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Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
setReferralRegister allows silent recipient redirection
setReferralRegister immediately replaces the registry pointer used by claim to resolve the recipient. There is no event, no timelock, and no two-step. Admin can therefore swap to a malicious registry that returns attacker-controlled addresses for any code; because claim resolves the recipient on every call, every subsequent rebate goes to the attacker until the registry is restored. This finding now also covers what was previously tracked separately as a missing event on the same function.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Distribution rounds down silently and ledger advances by full cumulative
claim writes claimedByCode[code] = accumulatedAmountUsd and then calls _distribute. Inside _distribute, transferToken = _usdToToken(transferUsd, decimals) truncates when transferUsd is not a multiple of 10**(18-decimals). The loop subtracts the full transferUsd from remainingUsd so the require remainingUsd == 0 check passes even though the recipient received less than the ledger says. The dust is silently retained and the recipient cannot recover it because subsequent claims use the already-incremented ledger as the baseline. For 6-decimal stablecoins the loss per claim is up to ~1e-6 USD; aligned cumulatives lose nothing.
optimization Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Use custom errors instead of revert strings
Every require uses a string literal.
Pending
#2 optimization Issue
Loop counter optimisation in _distribute
for (uint256 i = 0; i < length && remainingUsd > 0; i++) uses a postfix increment with checked arithmetic.
Pending
#3 optimization Issue
Constructor non-payable
The implementation constructor is non-payable.
informational Issues | 5 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
claim resolves recipient at execute time, allowing a recipient transfer to redirect a stockpiled signature
claim reads the recipient at call time, not at signature time. If a code holder transfers the recipient slot via ReferralRegister.updateRecipient between signing and execution, the funds go to the new recipient. This is documented behaviour but it has two consequences: a code holder can effectively redirect any pending claim by transferring the slot before submitting a stockpiled signature, and an off-chain replay infrastructure that batches signatures cannot rely on the recipient at sign time being the recipient at execute time.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
setSupportedToken ignores EnumerableMap return values (event/state mismatch)
_supportedTokens.set returns true if a new entry was added and false if an existing one was overwritten. _supportedTokens.remove returns true only if the entry existed. Both return values are dropped, so events can be emitted without state having actually changed.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
claim reads referralRegister.getRecipient before writing claimedByCode
getRecipient is external view on a contract whose pointer is admin-set. Solidity calls it via STATICCALL so the callee cannot mutate state, and claim has nonReentrant. The order is therefore safe today, but a future migration that drops view from the interface would silently break the assumption.
Pending
#4 informational Issue
Equal-zero comparison flagged on balanceUsd (false positive)
Slither flags if (balanceUsd == 0) continue as a dangerous strict equality.
Pending
#5 informational Issue
Two deprecated state slots are carried for storage layout
_deprecated_evaluationVault and _deprecated_claimed are carried under @custom:oz-renamed-from. _deprecated_evaluationVault is the artefact of a former pull-from-vault model that was replaced by the team-funded model.