TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
The contract includes functions that, prior to renouncement, allowed the owner to:
- The owner can set the burn holder address.
- The owner can set the minimum swap token balance to any arbitrary value.
- The owner can set the auto LP burn parameters and toggle the feature on or off.
- The owner can exclude any wallet from transaction fees or re-include them.
- The owner can designate or remove any address as an automated market maker pair.
- The airdrop contract can enable/disable the trade.
However, ownership has been renounced. These functions are now permanently disabled, and no changes can be made to the contract’s settings.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Burn smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the BurnBuild team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
autoBurnLiquidityPairTokens Function Destroys Token Value by Draining Liquidity
While the function's name and comments suggest a beneficial "burn" that would lock liquidity and increase value, its actual coded logic is provably destructive to the token's price and market stability. This is a critical and very real issue. The function does not burn LP (Liquidity Pool) tokens; instead, it unilaterally withdraws large quantities of the burnedFi token directly from the Uniswap liquidity pool and sends them to the contract itself. This action creates a severe imbalance in the pool's reserves, leaving the same amount of WETH paired with far fewer burnedFi tokens. The immediate and unavoidable result of this imbalance is a sharp price crash every time the function is executed. The function's name and comments are dangerously misleading; it is not a burn mechanism but a liquidity-draining function that systematically damages the token's own market value.
medium Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Rate-Limiting Logic in _drop Causes Permanent Fund Loss
The _drop function contains a critical flaw in its rate-limiting logic that leads to the permanent loss of user funds. The function is designed to allow only ten airdrop claims per block, but its if/else if structure fails to handle transactions that exceed this limit correctly. When the 11th user in a block calls the function, both conditional checks fail, but the transaction does not revert. As a result, the user's payment of 0.002 ETH is accepted by the contract, but they receive no tokens in return, and their ETH becomes permanently and irrecoverably trapped.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Transfer of tokens without enabling trade.
The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize addresses manually and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Trading Control Can Permanently Lock All User Assets
The contract contains a centralized mechanism that can enable or disable all token transfers, effectively acting as a kill switch for trading on decentralized exchanges. The _transfer function is gated by a require(launch, 'unlaunch') check, meaning all trading is frozen until the launch boolean is set to true. Control over this critical flag is given exclusively to the setLaunch function, which can only be called by the airdropAddr contract. This creates a single point of failure. If the airdropAddr contract contains a bug, is exploited, or simply fails to meet its predefined goal, it may never call setLaunch(true), leaving all user tokens permanently illiquid and untradable. This architecture places the entire utility of the token at the mercy of a separate, automated contract.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Remove safemath library
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
Remove unused code.