The userSeeder() function allows administrators to manually increase any user's userDeposits balance without requiring actual payment or token purchase. This function, absent in PresaleBASE.sol, enables arbitrary balance manipulation that can dilute legitimate purchasers' shares, create unfair distribution advantages for preferred users, or mask fund shortfalls by inflating recorded deposits beyond actual collected payments. The function lacks validation mechanisms to ensure added balances correspond to real contributions, creating potential for accounting fraud and unfair token distribution.

All purchase functions contain identical bugs in their unsold token calculations. When a round advances due to time expiry, the calculation unsoldTokens = rounds[0][currentStep] - total - amount incorrectly subtracts the current purchase amount twice. The variable total already includes the current purchase amount (from totalTokensSold += amount), but the code subtracts amount again explicitly. This results in remainingTokensTracker recording artificially low values for unsold tokens across both payment methods.

The contract contains numerous administrative setter functions that lack proper input validation, boundary checks, and state consistency verification. Key functions affected include setAdmin() (missing zero address check), setCurrentStep() (no bounds validation for step/checkpoint parameters), setTimeConstant() (no range limits), changeManager() (missing zero address validation), referrerDetails() and updateReferrerPercentage() (no percentage limits allowing values >100%), updateWeb3PaymentDetails() (uncapped percentage values), setSanctions() (no interface validation), and setRemainingTokensArray() (weak array validation). These functions can accept invalid parameters that could corrupt contract state, set impossible configurations, or render the contract unusable. For example, setting referrer percentages above 100% could drain contract funds, setting invalid step values could cause array bounds errors, and setting zero addresses for critical roles could lock administrative functions. The absence of these validations represents a significant administrative risk where operator errors could permanently damage the presale functionality.

The blacklistReferrer() function grants unchecked power to owner/manager to blacklist any addresses without validation, justification, or limits. This creates multiple centralization risks including malicious revenue theft (front-running transactions to blacklist referrers and steal commissions), retroactive punishment of successful referrers, competitive manipulation to favor preferred partners, and potential DoS through mass blacklisting. The function lacks critical safeguards such as zero address validation, array size limits, event logging, or protection against blacklisting critical addresses like the owner/manager themselves. There's no due process, appeal mechanism, or transparency requirements, allowing completely arbitrary decisions that can financially harm referrers who have invested time and effort building their networks. The absence of batch size limits enables gas-expensive operations that could impact contract usability.