BullGuess Info
BullGuess is the wild new kid on the blockchain, a fully on-chain prediction beast where sharp minds and bold calls win big. No fluff. No chance. Just pure skill and instant on-chain rewards. BullGuess runs high-speed BTCUSD prediction rounds 24/7 that turn precision into profit. Guess right, get paid. It’s raw. It’s real. It’s decentralized.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner can blacklist addresses
It is possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
StakingManager.sol
- The manager or owner can pause/unpause the buying functionality in the contract.
- The manager or owner can change the presale contract address.
- The manager or owner can change the stake token address.
- The manager or owner can modify the locked time duration for staking.
- The manager or owner can adjust the APY (Annual Percentage Yield) rate.
- The manager or owner can lock/unlock withdrawal functionality for all users.
- The manager or owner can lock/unlock direct staking functionality.
- The manager or owner can lock/unlock reward claims functionality.
- The manager or owner can modify the maximum deposit limit for the staking pool.
- The manager or owner can set withdraw lock time and claim start time parameters.
- The manager or owner can add users to the blacklist (preventing them from staking, withdrawing, or claiming rewards).
- The manager or owner can remove users from the blacklist.
- The manager or owner can change the staking end time.
- The manager or owner can transfer any ERC20 tokens from the contract to themselves (emergency withdrawal function).
- The manager can change the manager address to a new address.
- The owner can renounce the manager role (setting manager to zero address).
- The owner can transfer ownership of the contract to a new owner.
- The owner can renounce ownership of the contract entirely.
- The presale contract can stake tokens on behalf of users through the depositByPresale function.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BullGuess smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the BullGuess team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 7 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Unrestricted Fund Extraction
The manager or owner has unlimited power to withdraw any ERC20 tokens from the contract through the tokenTransfer() function, including user staked funds and accumulated rewards. This creates a critical risk where users can lose all their invested capital and earned rewards without recourse, as the function has no restrictions on token type or amount and uses unsafe transfer methods.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Arbitrary User Fund Lockout
The contract allows manager or owner to permanently blacklist users and globally lock withdrawals/claims, effectively freezing user funds indefinitely. Blacklisted users cannot stake, withdraw, claim rewards, or interact with the contract in any way, with no appeal process or time limits on these restrictions.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Economic Parameter Manipulation
The manager or owner can unilaterally modify critical economic parameters including APY rates, staking periods, lock times, and deposit limits at any time without user consent. These changes can retroactively affect user rewards and withdrawal schedules, potentially reducing expected returns or extending lock periods after users have already committed funds.
Pending
#4 medium Issue
Reentrancy in Withdrawal Function
The withdraw() function violates the Check-Effects-Interactions pattern by making external calls to _harvestRewards() and stakeToken.safeTransfer() before updating critical state variables like tokensStaked and deleting the user's poolStakers entry. This allows attackers to reenter the function through malicious token contracts or transfer hooks, enabling them to withdraw their staked amount multiple times while the contract state still shows they have funds available, potentially draining the entire contract.
Pending
#5 medium Issue
Cross-Function Reentrancy via Reward System
The _harvestRewards() internal function contains external stakeToken.safeTransfer() calls and is invoked by multiple functions including withdraw(), deposit(), and harvestRewards(), creating cross-function reentrancy vulnerabilities where attackers can reenter different functions while contract state remains inconsistent, allowing them to manipulate staking balances, claim rewards multiple times, or execute complex attack chains combining deposits and withdrawals.
Pending
#6 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions.
Pending
#7 medium Issue
Missing Input Validation
Functions setPresale(), setStakeToken(), and changeManager() lack zero address checks, potentially breaking core functionality and locking administrative access permanently. Economic Parameter Bounds: setAPY() accepts unlimited values risking integer overflow and treasury drainage. setLockedTime() can create permanent fund locks. setMaxDepositAmount() can be set to zero blocking deposits. Time Parameter Logic: setEndTime() and setWithdrawLockAndClaimStart() lack validation for past times or logical consistency, potentially trapping funds indefinitely. Array Input Limits: blacklistUsers() accepts unbounded arrays without zero address checks, creating gas limit DoS attacks and storage waste. This can make contract-breaking, permanent fund locks, economic exploits, and denial of service attacks. Requires comprehensive input validation implementation.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
Remove unused code.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.